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PRISONER DRUG TESTING UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
To combat narcotics use within penal institutions, several states have adopted pro-
grams to subject prisoners' urine samples to testing techniques which provide qualitative
readings of the existence of drugs within the test subject's system.' Prison authorities
require inmates in these states to provide a urine sample in the presence of prison
authorities for testing if the prison has chosen the inmate as part of a routine or random
"urine surveillance" program or the inmate has aroused suspicion of drug intoxication. 2
Although many methods in analytical drug screening technology are currently available, 3
the urine sample generally is subjected to on-site testing devices which rely on
immunochemistryi to detect the presence of various drugs in the body iluids. 3
lmmunochemistry devices are used widely in prison drug screening because the
technique is marketed as a urinalysis test to be performed on-site by personnel not
trained primarily as laboratory workers 6 — in other words, by prison staff members.
Prisons favor such on-site testing because it is cheaper and provides results more quickly
than outside labs.' The prison staff member who performs the scientific procedure need
not exercise discretion, read graphs, or make any subjective interpretations,6 for the test
generally provides a basic "positive" or "negative" readout, with no qualitative data.
' For a description of the technique employed, see infra notes 223-34 and accompanying text.
For a description of various drug testing programs, see, e.g., Higgs v. Wilson, 616 F. Supp. 226,
227-30 (W.D. Ky. 1985); Wykoff v. Resig, 613 F. Supp. 1504, 1506-07 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Tucker
v. Dickey, 613 F. Supp. 1124, 1126-27 (D. Wis. 1985); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214,
1216-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Denike v. Fauver, No. 83-2737, slip op. at 1-5 (D.N.J. April 6, 1984);
Hunt v. State, 173 Ga. App. 638, 638-39, 327 S.E.2d 500, 500 (1985) (probationers); Kane v. Fair,
Civ. No. 136229, slip op. at 8-9 (Super. Ct. Mass. Aug. 5, 1983); Hampson v. Saran, 319 N.W.2d
796, 797, 799 n.2 (N.D. 1982); Isaacks v. State, 646 S.W.2d 602, 602-03 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)
(probationers), review refused.
2 See, e.g., Peranzo v. Coughlin, 608 F. Supp. 1504, 1506 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
3
 The tests, which manufacturers are now marketing for urinalysis testing include thin layer
chromatography (TLC) and high performance TLC, gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/
MS) and high press liquid chromatography, and immunochemical techniques discussed infra notes
223-50 and accompanying text. For a good discussion of the types of tests available see McBay,
Cannabinoid Testing: Forensic and Analytical Aspects, LABORATORY MGMT., Vol. 23, No. I, 36, 38 ( Jan.
1985). See also Zeese, Marijuana Urinalysis Tests, DRUG L. REP., Vol. I, No. 3, 25, 26 (May—June
1983).
4 Immunochemistry is the branch of chemistry dealing with substances (as antibodies, antigens,
or haptens) and reactions (as concerned in the phenomenon of immunity-antibody production).
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL. DICTIONARY 1131 (4th ed. 1976).
Syva Corporation, of Palo Alto, California, manufactures the most commonly used technique,
which employs immunochemistry. Syva's Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique (hereinafter
EMIT) is discussed infra notes 223-50 and accompanying text, •
6 Morgan, Problems of Mass Urine Screening for Misused Drugs, J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS, Vol. 16(4),
305, 306 (Oct.—Dec. 1984).
7 Affidavit of George Vase at 3, Kane v. Fair, Giv. No. 136229 (Super. Ct. Mass. Aug. 5, 1983).
I Morgan, supra note 6, at 306. Another commonly used urine screening test is a radio immu-
noassay (RIA) screen, Roch Diagnostic ABUSCREEN THC, which also uses immunochemistry
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If the device displays a "positive" on the testing of an inmate's urine sample, the
prison automatically will charge the inmate with a major disciplinary infraction — the
introduction or use of a controlled substance. 9 At a disciplinary hearing, the government
then will use a positive urinalysis result as evidence of the inmate's illicit use of the drug
indicated by the result.'° While both the state and the inmate generally can introduce
certain additional inculpatory or exculpatory evidence, the prison may impose discipli-
nary sanctions solely on the basis of the single, positive reading." The disciplinary
sanction may include confinement to one's cell ("keep lock"),' 2 loss of good behavior
time credits ("good time" ), 13
 or an upgrade in security classification from, for example,
minimum to maximum custody status.' 4
 In addition, given the positive test result on the
inmate's record, the inmate may suffer future reduced opportunities for parole.' 3
A state's imposition of sanctions based upon evidence gathered from the mandatory
scientific testing of an individual's body fluids necessarily raises serious questions as to
the constitutionality of those sanctions under the fourth amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable search and seizure.' 6
 The fourth amendment provides that the government
shall not subject individuals to unwarranted and unreasonable searches of their persons,
homes, papers, and effects.' 7 The overriding purpose of the amendment is to safeguard
the personal privacy and dignity of the individual from governmental intrusion.' 3 The
techniques equivalent to the EMIT system. An RIA screen differs significantly from an EMIT
because the RIA relies upon the operator's subjective interpretation of agglutination and thus the
RIA requires more operator training. Zeese, supra note 3, at 26.
9
 Most prisons stipulate that drug use is a serious offense and a sample which indicates drug
use results in an automatic disciplinary hearing. See, e.g., Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. at 1506 (positive
test result automatically results in a "Misbehavior Report," which results in a disciplinary hearing);
Jensen v. Lick, 589 F. Supp. 35, 36 (D.N.D. 1984) (positive sample results in filing of an "incident
report" reference for disciplinary action). Refusal to take the test also results in a disciplinary charge
for a serious offense. See, e.g., id.; Hampson, 319 N.W.2d at 797.
°See, e.g., Hampson, 319 N.W.2d at 797.
" See, e.g., Jensen, 589 F. Supp. at 38-39.
12 Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. at 1506.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 1506 n.6.
16 U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution is applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
The Supreme Court eliminated any fifth amendment challenges to these tests, in effect, in
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966). The fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution protects an individual from being compelled to testify against himself or herself or to
otherwise provide the prosecution with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. Id. at
760-61. The fourteenth amendment, which is applicable to the states, embraces the fifth amend-
ment privilege. Id. at 760. In Schmerber, the Court upheld the admission of blood tests taken against
the defendant's will while under arrest and being treated at.a hospital for injuries, although the
state extracted blood without a warrant. Id. at 772. The Court held that the fifth amendment only
protected against communicative self-incrimination and not physical evidence. Id. at 765.
" For the text of the fourth amendment, see supra note 16.
'a Schmerber, 384 U.S. at ,767. As stated by the Court in an early Supreme Court case, the
framers intended the amendment to protect "the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life"
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words "unreasonable" and "searches and seizures" are terms of limitation;P 3 the amend-
ment covers only government practices which constitute searches or seizures and pros-
cribes only unreasonable searches. 2° Moreover, an individual must have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the area to be searched to invoke the protections of the
amendment. 21
Within the prison context, a unanimous United States Supreme Court has held that
individuals are not stripped of all constitutional protections upon incarceration. 22 Ac-
cordingly, many courts have held that prisoners are entitled to some measure of fourth
amendment protection, 23 particularly with regard to searches of the person. 24 In the
1984 case of Hudson v. Palmer,25 however, the Court severely limited the protection
available to prisoners under the fourth amendment. The Hudson Court held that pris-
oners do not have a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in their cells and
thus are not entitled to fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures of their individual cells and personal effects located therein. 26 Although the
Court appeared to limit its holding to the prisoner's cell and belongings,27 the scope of
from searches under unchecked general authority. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
For a discussion of the history of the circumstances motivating the adoption of the fourth amend-
ment, see id. at 624-30.
19 Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 356 (1974).
2° Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925). See also Amsterdam, supra note 19, at 356.
21 United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
22 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974). The Court in Wolff held that before the
government could deprive a prisoner of good time or confine the prisoner in disciplinary segre-
gation, it must conduct a hearing that comports with due process. Id. at 558. The due process
standards set forth by the Wolff Court are discussed infra note 73. The Court stated that although
the "needs and exigencies" of the institutional environment may diminish a prisoner's rights, "a
prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime."
Wolff; 418 U.S. at 555.
In keeping with the general principle in Wolff that prisoners do not forfeit all of their rights
upon entering the prison, the Court has held that prisoners enjoy freedom of speech and religion
under the first amendment, see, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (freedom of speech);
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam) (freedom of religion), are protected against
invidious discrimination on the basis of race under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (per curiam), and have the right to
reasonable access to the courts, Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969).
20 See, e.g., Lyon v. Farrier, 727 F.2d 766, 769 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 839 (1984); United
States v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1983), art. denied, 467 U.S. 1243 (1984); United
States v. Chamorro, 687 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1043 (1982); United States v.
Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 128-29 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240, 1245 (5th
Cir. 1978), reh'g denied, 599 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ready, 574 F.2d 1009, 1013
(10th Cir. 1978); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir: 1975), modified on other grounds,
545 F.2d 565 (1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978); Sostre v. Preiser, 519 F.2d 763, 764
(2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 415 U.S.
932 (1974); Daughtery v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292, 294 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872 (1973).
24 See, e.g., Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1223-24 (searches of the person distinctly different from
cell searches).
2° Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), on remand, Palmer v. Hudson, 744 F.2d 22 (4th Cir.
1984).
26 Id. at 525-26.
27 As the Hudson dissent notes, the majority "appears to limit its holding to a prisoner's 'papers
and effects' located in his cell" and a prisoner's person would appear to be "secure from unreason-
able search and seizure." Id. at 555 n.31 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Yet, as
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fourth amendment protection against searches of the person to which a prisoner is
entitled remains unclear.
This note examines the constitutional limitations on the government's power to
conduct urine surveillance testing in the prisons. Section one examines the factors that
indicate that a urinalysis is a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment and
concludes that urinalysis tests are searches and therefore subject to the fourth amend-
ment's limitations. 23 Section two examines the factors that indicate whether a urinalysis
search of prisoners is reasonable. This section draws from the jurisprudence of criminal,
administrative, and bodily intrusion searches, because the prison context shares features
of all three settings 29 Section two addresses methods by which courts have evaluated the
reasonableness of prison urinalysis programs. 3° Section two concludes with a look at the
reliability of the most widely used drug-screening technology as it reflects on the rea-
sonableness inquiry."
In the final section, this note examines the fundamental societal interests and special
factors in the prison setting that necessitate a thoughtful and principled evaluation of
the reasonableness of prison searches. 32 This final section argues that an inquiry into
reasonableness should begin with courts requiring prisons to establish written policies
justifying and outlining the search program. Written regulations would provide an
objective set of rules by which to measure reasonableness, decrease the discretion of
prison authorities, and consequently provide greater protection for inmates' privacy
rights.33 Courts then should examine closely individual searches against the prison's own
rules, evaluating both the reasonableness of the search and the regulations upon which
it is based. 34
I. URINALYSIS TESTS AS SEARCHES OF THE PERSON
A. Urinalysis Tests as Searches
The fourth amendment protects individuals' human dignity and privacy interests"
against unreasonable search and seizure." One's anatomy in particular is "draped with
constitutional protections." 37 The extension of the fourth amendment's protection to
prisoners subject to urinalysis testing thus requires an initial determination of whether
these tests are "searches" in the constitutional sense. Furthermore, even if the intrusion
one commentator notes, no such assurance appears in the majority opinion and the majority states,
in addition, that prison safety requires close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells.
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.9 at 212 (1978 &
Supp. 1985).
28 See infra notes 35-106 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 107-64 and accompanying text.
'"See infra notes 177-211 and accompanying text.
3 ' See infra notes 213-70 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 277-309 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 311-42 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 344-45 and accompanying text.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,769-70 (1966).
36 U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV. For the text of the fourth amendment, see supra note 16.
" United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325,1331 (5th Cir. 1978).
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is a search, constitutional protections pertain only to those searches which infringe on
an area in which a person has a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy."
Although urine testing may not resemble traditional searches of the person, which
involve physical touching of the individual's body or clothing," such a procedure is
analogous to other governmental searches which involve the search and seizure of an
individual's body components and are intended to reveal hidden matters or objects. 4°
The seminal case protecting fourth amendment interests in human dignity and privacy
from practices involving the seizure and subsequent analysis of material coming from
within a suspect's body is the 1966 case of Schmerber v. California:" The Supreme Court
in Schmerber determined that a bodily intrusion involving medical personnel extracting
a blood sample from an unconsenting defendant constituted a search within the meaning
of the fourth amendment. 42 The police had arrested the defendant in Schmerber for
driving while intoxicated, and medical personnel had drawn his blood to test for blood
alcohol content. 45 The Court distinguished the body intrusion in Schmerber from govern-
mental interferences with an individual's property interest." The Court stressed an
overriding concern with human dignity and privacy, 45 and placed the forced body-fluid
extraction within the "broadly conceived reach" of the fourth amendment. 46
58 United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). For a discussion of
Katz and the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test, see infra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
39 Amsterdam, supra note 19, at 356. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) ("frisk"
search); Afanador, 567 F.2d at 1328, 1331 (strip search); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968)
(clothing search).
4° Practices which courts have deemed searches within the meaning of the fourth amendment
include the collection of blood samples, see infra notes 41-46 and accompanying text, breath samples,
see infra note 50 and accompanying text, fingernail scrapings, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 293
(1973), and pubic hair, Bouse v. Bussey, 573 F.2d 548, 550 (7th Cir. 1977). In addition, a search
and seizure occurs when the government x-rays an individual, United States v. Allen, 337 F. Supp.
1041, 1043 (E.D. Pa. 1972), and when the government detains an individual until he or she expels
suspected contraband in a bowel movement, United States v. Mosquera-Ramirez, 729 F.2d 1352,
1356 (11th Cir. 1984).
A search does not occur, however, upon the seizure of physical characteristics which the
individual exposes constantly to the public, such as when the government compels an individual to
furnish a handwriting sample, United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973), or a voice exemplar,
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1973).
41 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The defendant in Schmerber challenged the government's extraction of
his blood on both fourth and fifth amendment grounds. Id. at 759. The Court rejected Schmerber's
claim that the search violated his privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment.
Id. at 761. For a discussion of the Court's reasoning, see supra note 16.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 767-68.
" Id. at 769-70. Indeed the Court emphasized the individual's privacy interest above any
discussion of the actual physical invasion involved in inserting a needle to extract blood. Id. For a
good discussion of the Court's concerns in Schmerber, see Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760-63
(1985). The Court in Winston stated that "[t]he intrusion [in Schmerber] perhaps implicated Schmer-
ber's most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy." Id. at 760.
46 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767. The Court ultimately upheld the search as reasonable. Id. at 772.
The Court reasoned in part that a blood test is a routine procedure causing minimal risk, pain, or
trauma. Id. at 771. The Court's finding that the intrusion associated with a blood test is reasonable
and "routine", id. at 771 n.13, however, did not preclude the Court's characterization of the
procedure as a search. Id. at 767. For a discussion of the Court's analysis of the reasonableness of
the blood test in Schmerber see infra notes 147-69 and accompanying text.
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In later cases, lower courts extended the Schmerber holding and found a search of
the person where the governmental practices contemplated involved arguably nonphys-
ical intrusions, such as performing an x-ray47 or collecting a breath sample. 48 By analogy
to Schmerber, these courts' have focused on the mandatory seizure of a person's body
components to hold that such practices constitute searches. 49 For example, a Pennsylvania
superior court in Commonwealth v. Quarks viewed the difference between a blood and a
breath test . as insignificant where both involved seizure, of blood or air, and the material
seized came from within the suspect's body. 5°
In keeping with the Schmerber decision and its progeny, lower courts similarly have
analogized, if at times reluctantly,51 urinalysis testing procedures to the blood extraction
in Schmerber and have characterized the procedure as a search of the person. In 1984, a
New York federal district court in Storms v. Coughlin noted that a urinalysis does not
require a penetration of the skin, as does the extraction of blood, but nevertheless viewed
the forced extraction of urine as an intrusion beyond the body's surface similar to that
in Schmerber. 52 In 1985, a federal district court in Iowa, in McDonnell v. Hunter, stated
that like a blood test, a urinalysis procedure requires the removal and analysis of fluids
contained within an individual's body."
In addition, courts have invoked the human dignity and.privacy bases of the Schmer-
ber decision to characterize as a search the forced performance before authorities" of
what is regarded ordinarily as a private bodily function. The Storms court found such a
test particularly degrading where the prison forced the individual under threat of
punishment to urinate into a container held by another." The McDonell court acknowl-
edged that urine testing, unlike blood testing, did not require a governmental intrusion
47 See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 337 F. Supp. 1041, 1043 (ED. Pa. 1972). The Allen court, in
finding that an x-ray constituted a search, viewed Schmerber as leading to the conclusion that "blood,
hair and other bodily components arc objects to be seized only through the warrant process or one
of the recognized exceptions thereto." Id. at 1043. The court went on to add that although the
government does not actually seize x-rays from the person, x-rays do penetrate the body and the
government uses the individual's own body to make the x-ray. Id.
4 " See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Quarles, 229 Pa. Super. 363, 377 n.4, 324 A.2d 452, 460 n.4
(1974).
49 See id.; Allen, 337 F. Supp. at 1043.
5° 229 Pa. Super. 363, 377 n.4, 324 A.2d 452, 460 n.4 (1974).
See, e.g., Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 488 (N.D. Ga. 1985). The Marietta court
stated that while it had "some doubts whether requiring a person to provide a sample of his urine
for analysis is the kind of 'search' contemplated by the framers of the fourth amendment, the court
feels constrained by current law to hold that a urinalysis is a search within the meaning of that
amendment." Id. The Marietta court then went on to cite Schmerber as controlling. Id. at 488-89.
" 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The Storms court found a urinalysis test "indis-
tinguishable" from the blood test covered by the fourth amendment in Schmerber. Id. The court
reasoned that both tests involved involuntary forced extraction of bodily fluids or, in effect, intru-
sions, "if not literally," beyond the body surface. Id. at 1218.
55 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (D. Iowa 1985).
54 Prisons conduct urine tests in the presence of prison staff to assure that prisoners do not
tamper with the sample. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. 550.30(c) (1986) (federal prison regulations dictate
official to be present to assure sample is not diluted). See also Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1218 (prisoner
performs test in presence of prison guard).
" Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1218. The Storms court found that such a procedure is "purely and
simply degrading" and plainly implicates interest protected by the fourth amendment. Id.
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into the body but nevertheless characterized such a test as a search because an individual
generally discharges and disposes of urine in private.56
In sum, although a urinalysis involves no literal governmental intrusion into the
body, a court likely will characterize a mandatory urinalysis test as a search because it
closely resembles a blood test. In Schmerber,. the Supreme Court found a blood test to be
a search because it intruded on an individual's interests in body integrity, personal
privacy, and dignity. 57 In recent decisions, courts have drawn from the Schmerber Court's
analysis to find that urinalysis programs invoke the same fundamental human interests
which the Schmerber Court set forth with regard to blood testing. Accordingly, these
courts have treated the practice as a search and examined whether these urinalysis tests
violate the fourth amendment's prohibition against search and seizures. 55
B. Interests Protected by the Fourth Amendment
A search will not violate the fourth amendment unless it infringes on an area in
which an individual harbors a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy. 59 Justice
Harlan set forth this "reasonable expectation of privacy" requirement in his 1967 con-
curring opinion in United Stales v. Katz.6° In Katz, the Court examined an individual's
w McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1127. The McDonell court addressed the reasonableness of urinalysis
testing of prison guards and concluded that the prison could conduct such tests only upon reason-
able suspicion. Id. at 1130.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
58 Other courts have simply treated the practice as a search, see, e.g., Committee for GI Rights
v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Shoemaker v. Handel, 608 F. Supp. 1151, 1156
later proceeding, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985), aff'd 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 577 (1986); Hampson, 319 N.W,2d at 799-800; Ewing v. State, 160 Ind. App. 138, 149,
310 N.E.2d 571, 578 (1974) (en banc), or have grounded their finding on precedent, without
independent analysis of the factors that indicate that the urinalysis is a search. See, e.g., Tucker, 613
F. Supp. at 1127 (citing Schmerber as precedent); Marietta, 601 F. Supp. at 988-89 (citing Schmerber
as precedent); Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74, 81 (CMA 1983) (citing Committee for GI Rights as
precedent).
59 United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
60 Id. (Harlan, J., concurring). The original expectation of privacy test which emerged from
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion to Katz included two prongs. To establish a fourth amendment
claim, an individual first would have to exhibit "an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy." Id.
(Harlan, J., concurring). Second, the expectation of privacy would have to "be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable. — Id. (Harlan, J., concurring). Some courts later used the
subjective prong to deny prisoners fourth amendment protections. See Gianelli and Gilligan, Prison
Searches and Seizures: "Locking" The Fourth Amendment Out Of Correctional Facilities, 62 VA. L. REV.
1045, 1059 (1976) (discussing series of cases which applied the subjective prong). For example, a
California Court of Appeal used the subjective prong approach to deny fourth amendment pro-
tection to prisoners based on the argument that if a prisoner knows the priion will search him or
her, the prisoner cannot claim that he or she expected privacy. People v. Califano, 5 Cal. App. 3d
476, 482, 85 Cal. Rptr. 292, 296 (2d Dist. 1970). The Califano court reasoned that because the tape
recorded conversation of two co-defendants in the jail's interview room began with the defendant's
comment "[t]hey the police] are probably listening right now," the defendants had demonstrated
no subjective expectation of privacy. Id. One commentator terms the Califano case "incredible" and
asserts, "the proposition that a prisoner has less privacy because everyone knows that there is less
privacy in jail, and therefore he has no reasonable expectation of privacy is one of the most
outrageous examples of tautological thinking espoused in many years." Singer, Privacy, Autonomy,
and Dignity in the Prison: A Preliminary Inquiry Concerning Constitutional Aspects of the Degradation Process
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claim that the fourth amendment protected him from governmental electronic surveil-
lance of his conversations in a public phone booth. 61 The government in Katz argued
that Katz was not entitled to fourth amendment protection because a public phone booth
was not a "constitutionally protected area." 62 The Katz Court rejected the government's
"constitutionally protected area" argument and emphasized that the fourth amendment
protects people, not places. 63 The Court in Katz found that the fourth amendment may
protect matters which an individual reasonably seeks to preserve as private, even in a
public area. 64 Thus, the Court in Katz held that an individual who entered a public
phone booth, closed the door, and paid the toll reasonably could expect that govern-
mental electronic surveillence would not monitor his or her conversation. 65 In his con-
curring opinion, Justice Harlan noted that for an individual's expectation of privacy to
be constitutionally justifiable, it must be one that "society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.'" 66
In the context of the prison environment, the question then becomes whether society
is willing to recognize as reasonable prisoners' expectations of privacy in their body areas,
living quarters, and belongings. The traditional view of prisoners' fourth amendment
rights generally assumed that the fourth amendment did not apply to prisoners. 67 A
in Our Prisons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 669, 678 n.26 (1971-72). As another commentator notes, "the
government could diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing
half-hourly on television that ... we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic
surveillance." Amsterdam, supra note 19, at 384. Thus Justice Harlan's subjective expectation test
raises serious questions as to what the government can or cannot take away by simply notifying an
individual or the community at large that conversations or certain activities are not private.
The Supreme Court in 1971 — four years after Katz and one year after Cahlano — stressed
the controlling importance of the second prong of the Katz test in United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 751-52 (1971). In effect, the Court refused to adopt the subjective expectation prong. See
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 n.7 (1984) (the Court recounts its rejection of the Katz test in
the White decision).
61 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
62 Id. at 351.
65 Id. Prior to Katz, the Court had described some of its fourth amendment conclusions in terms
of "constitutionally protected" areas. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510, 512
(1961).
"Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
65 Id. at 350, 352. The Court concluded that the government's electronic surveillance without
a warrant was unreasonable. Id. at 357-59.
66 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). For example, the Court has noted that some containers,
such as a gun case, cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because observers can
infer the container's contents from its outside appearance. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
764 n.13 (1979). In contrast, an individual does have a reasonable expectation of privacy in luggage,
because luggage typically holds personal effects and closed pieces of luggage hide their contents
from view. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 424-25 (1981).
67 W. LAFAVE, supra note 27, § 10.9 at 397. In 1919, in Stroud v. United States the Court held
that a prison warden could seize and search a prisoner's letters without a warrant or probable cause.
251 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1919). The state later could use the letters in a criminal case against the
defendant without violating the fourth amendment. Id. Forty-three years later, in 1962, the Court
commented in Lanza v. New York, that "a jail shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home,
an automobile, an office, or a hotel room" and that "official surveillance has traditionally been the
order of the day" in prison. 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962). The defendant in Lanza refused to answer
the questions of a state legislative committee investigating corruption in the state parole system,
and the lower court had convicted him for contempt. Id. at 140. The defendant challenged the
conviction, contending that the questions were based on information gathered from a conversation
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unanimous Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell," addressing a prisoner's claim that
disciplinary proceedings at the prison violated his due process rights, 69 seemingly altered
this position in 1974, when it stated that "a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitu-
tional protections when he is imprisoned for crime."" The Wolff Court rejected a "hands
off" approach to prison practices, whereby courts accorded absolute discretion to prison
officials." Instead, the Wolff Court held that prisoners' rights should be an accommo-
dation between the "institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Consti-
tution."72 Thus, according to the Wolff Court, the state must conduct a hearing that
comports with due process before it can deprive a prisoner of good time or confine the
between the defendant and his brother, who was in jail, that jail officers secretly had monitored.
Id. at 141. The Court in Lanza upheld the conviction because the state had derived some of the
questions from information independent of the conversation. Id. at 145, 147. Thus, the plurality
did not ground its decision on the earlier quoted language, which essentially had espoused the view
that a jail is not a "constitutionally protected area." See Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note 60, at 1055
(Lanza is the "leading case" in support of the application of the "constitutionally protected area"
analysis to jails to deny prisoners constitutional protections). Although Katz rejected the use of the
"constitutionally protected area" analysis, see supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text, references
to Lanza continue to appear in recent prison search cases. See, e.g., Hudson, 968 U.S. at 538
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting and citing Lanza); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 556-57 (1979)
(citing Lanza). See also State v. Brotherton, 2 Ore. App. 157, 160, 465 P.2d 749, 750 (1970) ("Prison
authorities may subject inmates to institutional searches unimpeded by fourth amendment bar-
riers.") (citations omitted). The lower courts subsequently relied on these two Supreme Court
decisions to conclude that prison authorities could subject prisoners to intense surveillance and
searches "unimpeded by fourth amendment barriers." See the same language in Califano, 5 Cal.
App. 3d at 481, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 296; People v. Chandler, 262 Cal. App. 2d 350, 356, 68 Cal. Rptr.
645, 648 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1043 (1969). But cf. Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1223-24 (distin-
guishing Lanza as precedent in prison body search area). One commentator objects to the Bell
Court's citation of Lanza and Stroud and further questions the precedential value of these cases in
the fourth amendment context. See Note, Constitutional Limitations on Body Searches in Prisons, 82
Comm. L. REv. 1033, 1044 n.84 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Body Searches] (citing Gianelli and Gilligan,
supra note 60, at 1055-58; Singer, supra note 60, at 673-75; Annot., 32 A.L.R. FED. 601, 612-14
(1977 & Supp. Oct. 1985)).
" 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
69
 The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. Cous-r. amend. XIV.
70 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555.
7I
 See id. at 555-56. Courts had held under the "hands off" doctrine that they lacked jurisdiction
to adjudicate prisoner complaints. See Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note 60, at 1047 and n.18. In
Procunier v. Martinez, the Court expressly rejected this approach: "[w]hen a prison regulation or
practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to
protect constitutional rights." 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974). Although the Court rejected this policy
of judicial restraint, it nevertheless has accorded significant judicial deference to prison officials.
See, e.g., Bell, 441 U.S. at 546-48. As commentators point out, the Court's deference doctrine could
lead to the same "immunization" of correctional officials from judicial scrutiny as did the "hands
off" doctrine. See Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note 60, at 1047 n.18. The dissent in Hudson appears
to share this concern when it states that the majority's absolute discretion accorded prison officials
to conduct cell searches is a return to the "'hands off' approach to prison administration." Hudson,
468 U.S. at 555 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For discussions of the
"hands off" doctrine, see Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L.
REV. 985 (1962); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints
of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
72 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. The Court commented in Wolff that "the needs and exigencies" of
the penal environment necessarily could restrict a prisoner's constitutional rights. Id. at 555.
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prisoner in disciplinary segregation." In defining the extent of the constitutional pro-
tections suggested by Wolff however, the Court has appeared reluctant to take an
expansive view of the expectation of privacy to be accorded a prisoner. Consequently, a
prisoner's fourth amendment protection from searches of the person remains unclear
despite Wolff.
Four years after Wolff, in 1978, the Court in Bell v. Wolfish" addressed its first fourth
amendment prison claim since its decision in Wolff. Bell evaluated the constitutionality
of visual body cavity searches of prisoners." The challenged search practices in Bell
included cell searches conducted in the prisoner's absence and routine body cavity
searches following contact visits with persons from outside the institution." Although
the Court reiterated Wolff s assertion that prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional
protections,77 it also commented that the fourth amendment may provide no protection
for a person confined in a detention facility." The Court nevertheless assumed "for
present purposes"" that the fourth amendment did apply and subsequently upheld both
search practices as reasonable."
Significantly, the Bell majority did concede that the practice of conducting body
cavity searches "instinctively gives us the most pause."83
 Furthermore, while not specifi-
cally holding that prisoners have legitimate expectations of privacy in their person, the
Court.did subject the searches to a fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry. The Court
stated that the prison must conduct the practice in a reasonable manner, 82 citing Schmer-
ber, where the Court found that administering a mandatory blood test implicates a
criminal defendant's reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy. 83 In addition, the
decision to uphold the body searches was far from unanimous, with four justices dis-
senting.al Justice Marshall viewed these searches as representative of "one of the most
73 Id. at 558. Under the standards set forth in Wolff, minimum standards of procedural due
process require advance written notice of the violation, a written statement by the factfinders of
the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken, and the opportunity to call
witnesses and present evidence in his or her defense. Id. at 563-66.
54 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
" Id. at 558-60.
58 Id. at 528-29. The Bell case involved practices imposed on "pre-trial detainees," or individuals
not convicted of crimes yet committed CO a detention facility. Id, at 531. The challenged conditions
included, in addition to cell and person searches, prison overcrowding and restrictions on the
receipt of books and personal items. Id. at 528. The lower court had found the practices unconsti-
tutional on due process grounds, holding that the government could only subject pretrial detainees
to deprivations for which it could demonstrate a "compelling necessity." Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d
118,124 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
" Bell, 441 U.S. at 545.
" Id. at 556-57 (citing Lanza, 370 U.S. at 143-44). The Court in Bell stated that "it may well
be argued that a person confined in a detention facility has no reasonable expectation of privacy
with respect to his room or cell and that therefore the Fourth Amendment provides no protection
for such a person." Id. For a discussion of Lanza, see supra note 67.
" Bell, 441 U.S. at 558.
88 Id. at 560.
" Id. at 558.
52 Id. at 560 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771-72).
Ss Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767. For a discussion of Schmerber, see supra notes 41-46 and accom-
panying text.
" Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens dissented from the majority. Justice Powell
found the body cavity searches unreasonable unless based on "some level of cause, such as a
reasonable suspicion." Bell, 441 U.S. at 563 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
September 1986]	 PRISONER DRUG TESTING	 999
grievous offenses against personal dignity and common decency."" Indeed, Justice Pow-
ell, concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined the opinion of the Court with the
single exception of the holding with respect to the body cavity searches.B 6
In sum, Bell neither requires nor forecloses possible constitutional limitations on the
power of prison officials to conduct body searches of prisoners." Bell seems to indicate
that prisoner body searches implicate the fourth amendment and will be permissible
only if reasonable. The Court in Bell provides no guidelines, however, for determining
the reasonableness of a search." In addition, the Bell decision did not turn solely or
even predominantly on fourth amendment issues." It remains, however, the only Su-
preme Court pronouncement in the area of constitutional limitations on body searches
in prison."
A full decade after the unanimous decision in Wolff and six years after Bell, a
majority of the Supreme Court in Hudson v. Palmer held that prisoners do not have a
reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in their cells and belongings, and
consequently, that the fourth amendment has no application to prisoners' cells or be-
longings." The prisoner in Hudson challenged a prison official's search of his locker and
cell in which the official destroyed the prisoner's noncontraband, personal property. 92
Applying the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test," the majority reasoned that
society recognizes that a prisoner's expectation of privacy always yields to the institution's
interests in institutional security." Thus, although the majority held only that society is
Justice Marshall would permit body cavity searches only if they were.of compelling necessity. Id. at
578 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens and Brennan viewed such practices as punishment
of pretrial detainees, whom the government had not adjudicated as guilty in accordance with due
process of law. Id. at 580-84 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 576-77 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
9° Id. at 563 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell would have
the Court require "at least some level of cause." Id.
87 Note, Body Searches, supra note 67, at 1038 (Bell does not foreclose constitutional limitations).
88 The majority in Bell merely states that such searches cannot be conducted "in an abusive
fashion" and "must be conducted in a reasonable manner." Bell, 441 U.S. at 560. For one district
court's comments on the Bell Court's failure to provide guidelines, see infra note 168.
" Note, Body Searches, supra note 67, at 1034.
9° Id. at 1033.
1 468 U.S. 517,525-26,528 n.8 (1984).
"Id. at 520.
BB See supra notes 59-66 for a discussion of the Katz test.
" Hudson, 468 U.S. at 528. The Court stated:
A right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incom-
patible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to
ensure institutional security and internal order. We are satisfied that society would
insist that the prisoner's expectation of privacy always yield to what must be considered
the paramount interest in institutional security. We believe that it is accepted by our
society that "[floss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confine-
ment."
Id. at 527-28 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 537). Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Marshall, dissented in Hudson and challenged the majority's assumption that a
prisoner has no legitimate privacy expectation in his or her personal effects. Id. at 542 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent contended that the majority's "perception
of what society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is not based on any empirical data; rather it
merely reflects the perception of the four Justices who have joined the opinion that THE CHIEF
JUSTICE has authored."Id. at 549 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
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not prepared to recognize a prisoner's expectation of privacy in his cell, the Hudson
language concerning a prisoner's expectation of privacy leaves open the question of
whether a prisoner maintains a legitimate and reasonable expectation of privacy in his
person.
Despite the possible interpretation of the majority's language in Hudson and the
absence in Bell of a dear holding that prisoners have fourth amendment rights with
regard to body searches. 95 lower courts continue to rule that a prisoner retains a legiti-
mate and reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to searches of the person.° In
original). The dissent viewed a consensus in the lower courts "of some significance. Virtually every
federal judge to address the question over the past decade has concluded that the Fourth Amend-
ment does apply to a prison cell. There is similar unanimity among the commentators." Id. at 549-
50 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent then listed as support for
this proposition sixteen circuit court decisions, including all but the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits
and five commentaries. Id. at 549. n.19. 550 n.20 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). In addition, the dissent noted its assumption that the majority "appears to limit its holding
to a prisoner's 'papers and effects' located in his cell and apparently believes that at least a prisoner's
'person' is secure from unreasonable search and seizure." Id. at 555 n.31 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
Indeed both Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Burger have recognized that some expectation
of privacy continues in prison. Before appointment to the United States Supreme Court, Justice
Stevens, as Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit, addressed a state prisoner's claim that guards
had violated his constitutionally protected interests in privacy and property when a prisoner lost
his trial transcript in a shakedown search of his cell. See Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th
Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978). Justice Stevens wrote "[ ,,v]e are persuaded
... that the surrender of privacy is not total and that some residuum meriting the protection of
the Fourth Amendment survives the transfer into custody." Id. at 1316. The court concluded, "[w]e
hold that a prisoner enjoys the protections of the fourth amendment against unreasonable searches,
at least to some minimal extent." Id. at 1317.
Chief Justice Burger recognized that prisoners have some residuum of privacy in a 1978
decision rejecting members of the news media's first amendment challenge to government policies
restricting their access to a county prison:
It is true that inmates lose some rights when they are lawfully confined, but they do
not lose all civil rights .... Inmates in jails, prisons, or mental institutions retain
certain fundamental rights of privacy; they are not like animals in a zoo to be filmed
and photographed at will by the public or by media reporters, however "educational"
the process may be for others.
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1978). Although the Chief Justice's assertion appeared
in a context other than a fourth amendment analysis, the Hudson dissent quoted the above passage
in support of its assertion that the majority should recognize that a prisoner retains some residuum
of privacy under the fourth amendment in his cell and belongings. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 542 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also W. LAFAVE, supra note 27, at 211-12 (Supp.
1985). Professor LaFave comments:
Hudson merely finds that the Fourth Amendment affords no protection for the pris-
oner's privacy interest in his cell or his possessory interest in his effects kept there,
and thus arguably has no application to searches and seizures of the person of a
prisoner, which would remain subject to the minimal Fourth Amendment protections
discussed herein .... Hopefully this will turn out to be the case, for, as unfortunate
as the Hudson holding is, it would be even more intolerable if prisoners were also
lacking any Fourth Amendment protection against even serious, repeated and de-
grading intrusions upon their persons.
Id.
" See supra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
96 See, e.g., Tucker, 613 F. Supp. at 1128 ("Hudson neither held nor implied that prisoners have
no justifiable expectation of privacy in their persons"); Smith v. Montgomery County, MD, 607 F.
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the specific area of urinalysis searches, two courts expressly have rejected the argument
that Hudson stands for the proposition that prisoners retain no reasonable expectation
of privacy from searches of the person.° For example, the New York federal district
court in Storms v. Coughlin 98 stressed that Hudson did not address the prisoner's body
privacy interests.° The court reasoned that the fundamental change which occurs when
a prisoner exchanges his or her home outside the prison for a cell inherently diminishes
the prisoner's expectation of privacy in his or her immediate surroundings. The Storms
court stated that the body, however, undergoes no change upon incarceration.'" The
Storms court concluded, despite Hudson, that prisoners retain reasonable and legitimate
expectations of privacy in their persons.'°'
Thus, lower courts have refused to extend the Supreme Court's holding in Hudson
that prisoners do not retain reasonable expectations of privacy in their cells and effects
to cases involving body searches or urinalysis testing of prisoners. These courts reason
that Hudson did not address person searches and that prisoners' privacy interests in their
cells and effects clearly are distinguishable from their privacy interest in their own
persons. In addition, although the Court in the earlier body cavity search decision,
Be11,' 02 did not hold specifically that prisoners have reasonable expectations of privacy
in their persons, it did subject the searches to a fourth amendment analysis.'"
Supp. 1303, 1306-07 (D. Md. 1985) (Hudson applies to cell searches, not searches of the person).
See also Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1223. In Storms, the state of New York contended that Hudson
forbade any reasonableness inquiry regarding the state's practice of conducting mandatory urine
testing. Id. The Storms court, in rejecting the state's argument, noted that Hudson held that "in
effect, ... Fourth Amendment protection stops at the cell door [but that] [tihis, however, is
distinctly different from holding that it stops at the prison door." Id. The Storms court found that
Bell expressly reserved this issue of the prisoner's privacy interest in his or her person and that the
Court in Hudson did not address this issue. Id. (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 558). Professor LaFave also
comments that the Hudson decision "merely finds that the Fourth Amendment affords no protection
for the prisoner's privacy interest in his cell or ... effects." W. LAFAVE, supra note 27, at 211 (Supp.
1985). See supra note 94 for Professor LaFave's additional comments on the Hudson holding. For a
periodically updated compilation of cases holding that the fourth amendment applies in prison to
searches of the person, see generally Annot., 32 A.L.R. FED. 601, § 8 (1977 & Supp. Oct. 1985).
°'? See Tucker, 613 F. Supp. at 1128; Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1223.
98 600 F. Supp. 1214.
" Id. at 1223.
'°° Id. The Storms court noted:
Unlike the cell which, as Hudson noted, ''shares none of the attributes of privacy of a
home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room," [citations omitted], a prisoner's body
remains the same whether in or out of prison. There is an inherent diminution in the
privacy interest adhering in an individual's immediate surroundings when he or she
exchanges apartments for a cell. The body undergoes no such fundamental change
when incarcerated. The surroundings become less private; the body remains the same.
Thus the Hudson balancing of interests between the prisoners' interests and those
of the institution is not so readily struck wholly in favor of the institution.
Id. at 1223-24. Accord Tucker, 613 F. Supp. at 1128 (quoting same passage in Storms). The Storms
analysis appears consistent with the Court's distinction in Schmerber between an individual's body
and property interests. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
101 Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1224. The Storms court thus went on to evaluate the reasonableness
of the urine program and issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the prison's program because
the tests as implemented included an unjustified potential for abuse. Id. at 1226. See infra notes
198-202 and accompanying text.
102 441 U.S. 520 (1979). For a discussion of Bell, see supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
'" Bell, 441 U.S. at 558-60. Moreover, the Court in Bell expressed some hesitation before
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In conclusion, urinalysis tests of prisoners are searches in the constitutional sense.
Urinalysis tests are closely analogous to blood test extractions. Like blood tests, urinalysis
tests implicate human dignity and privacy and bodily integrity interests which the fourth
amendment protects.' 04 In addition, prisoners, despite incarceration, retain a reasonable
and legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to governmental searches of the
person.los Because urinalysis tests of prisoners are searches for fourth amendment
purposes, they are subject to the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure.m6
II. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT OF REASONABLENESS UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
Once an individual has adequately alleged a search, the question then becomes
whether the government's conduct was unreasonable.'°2 An analysis of the reasonable-
ness of a search requires a balancing of the significance of the intrusiveness of the search
on the individual's constitutionally protected interests in personal privacy and bodily
integrity against the promotion of legitimate government interests.I 08
 Ultimately, the
reasonable search must be no greater an intrusion than is reasonably necessary. 10°
In setting forth the parameters of a reasonable search, the Supreme Court tradi-
tionally has emphasized that the definition of reasonableness turns on the existence of
three protections: probable cause, warrants, and specificity."° In the criminal context,
where the government searches to discover evidence of guilt for a crime committed,"
these protections are the threshold requirements, with limited exceptions," 2 for con-
ducting a reasonable search and seizure. In the administrative search context, where the
government searches to prevent or abate health and safety hazards,"' the Court has
established less stringent standards. In this area, the Court has reasoned that inspections
upholding as reasonable the prison's practice of conducting body cavity searches. Id. at 558. See
supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
104 See supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
'°5 See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
126
 See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
107 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
1 °8 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,20-21 (1968).
188 Id. at 21.
"° Gianelli & Gilligan, supra note 60, at 1066; Amsterdam, supra note 19, at 358. See United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891,896 (1975) (Court always has regarded probable cause as the minimum
requirement for lawful search); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,110-11 (1964) (reasons for prefer-
ring warrants go to the foundations of the fourth amendment); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 n.18 (specificity
is a "central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence").
"L See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,760 (1985).
1'2 See infra note 123 for exceptions to the standard fourth amendment warrant requirement.
"5 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,535 (1967). The Court in Camara addressed the
constitutionality of housing code enforcement inspection programs. For a discussion of Camara, see
infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text. In distinguishing administrative from criminal searches,
the Court stated:
[u]nlike the search pursuant to a criminal investigation, the inspection programs at
issue here are aimed at securing city-wide compliance with minimum physical stan-
dards for private property. The primary governmental interest at stake is to prevent
even the unintentional development of conditions which are hazardous to public health
and safety.
Camara, 387 U.S. at 535.
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may be the only effective way to achieve compliance with health and safety standards" 4
and traditional fourth amendment requirements might frustrate the governmental pur-
pose behind the search." 5 Furthermore, in addition to the requirements of reasonable-
ness that obtain in an administrative or criminal context, courts have looked to the
factors of reasonableness that the Supreme Court emphasized in evaluating the reason-
ableness of a blood extraction search when evaluating a search which intrudes on an
individual's right to be secure in his or her person. 16 In sum, an assessment of the
reasonableness of a urinalysis search of a prisoner requires a multifaceted inquiry which
considers the context in which the search takes place and the special concerns that a
search of the person presents.
A. The Reasonableness of Searches in the Criminal and Administrative Settings
In the prison context, the distinction between prison searches as law enforcement
or administrative is blurred.'" The Court in Bell v. Wolfish, however, established that
prison officials can conduct warrantless body cavity searches on a routine basis, based
on no individual suspicion of misconduct.'" Thus, a determination of a principled basis
upon which to evaluate the reasonableness of prison urinalysis search programs requires
an understanding of the protective objectives of the ,traditional fourth amendment
requirements in the criminal setting. In addition, although the Court has departed from
traditional fourth amendment restrictions, particularly in the administrative search con-
text, it has not abandoned the objectives of those traditional protections. Rather, the
Court has set forth less restrictive substitutes which support the same objectives.
The traditional fourth amendment requirements — probable cause, warrants, and
specificity — provide fundamental safeguards against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. First, the probable cause standard requires that officials wishing to search have
antecedent justification for a search.'" Officials must show sufficient indicia of suspicion
— termed probable cause — that they will find inculpatory evidence in the place or on
the person they will search.' 2° Second, the probable cause standard ensures that the facts
which give rise to the suspicion are capable of measurement and hence reviewable against
an objective standard. 12 '
" 4 Camara, 387 U.S. at 535.
15 1d. at 533.
"6 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757. See infra notes 147-64 and accompanying text for a discussion
of courts that have looked to Schmerber in assessing the reasonableness of a person search. The
Court in Schmerber highlighted the distinction between searches of the person and searches of an
individual's property interests — that is, an individual's papers or apartment.
" 7 Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note 60, at 1083. See infra notes 297-302 and accompanying
text.
119 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979).
"9 See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42, 51 (1970).
129 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) ("some quantum of
individualized suspicion" required). See also Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows
on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. Rev. 664, 687 (1961) (Probable cause requires that "two
conclusions ... must be supported by substantial evidence: that the items sought are in fact seizable
by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to
be searched.").
12] See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) ("the reasonableness standard usually
requires, at a minimum, that the facts upon which an intrusion is based be capable of measurement
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The warrant standard requires that officials seek search warrants, authorizing the
search, issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate." 122 The Court has deemed war-
rantless searches unreasonable, with only limited "jealously and carefully drawn" excep-
tions. 123
 The significance of the warrant requirement lies in its imposition of a judicial
decisionmaker between the privacy interests of the person to be searched and the official
"in the field." 124 Thus, the warrant requirement provides a check on the ability of low-
level officials to exercise arbitrary power. In addition, warrants provide the individual
to be searched with the means of verifying the lawful limits of the searcher's power to
search. 123 Finally, the courts have required that the warrant particularly describe the
item or matters to be seized.' 26 The specificity requirement limits the search to the items
described in the search warrant"' and thus limits the search to the intrusion necessitated
by the search objectives.
Although the Court has developed these traditional fourth amendment protections
— probable cause, warrants, and specificity — primarily in the context of crime inves-
tigation, the Court expressly has noted that the protection of the fourth amendment
does not apply only when a criminal investigation is under way. According to the Court,
the fourth amendment protects the personal privacy of all citizens, and not just those
individuals suspected of criminal activity. 128 Thus, under the Court's traditional require-
ments, the government ordinarily could conduct the search of a person as part of an
inspection only pursuant to a search warrant based on probable cause that the particular
person to be searched had violated a regulation which the inspection sought to enforce.
The Court has developed departures from the usual fourth amendment restraints,
however, in the context of both criminal and administrative searches, where the govern-
mental intrusion is necessary to fulfill a traditional government function ensuring a
strong government interest. For example, the Court has upheld warrantless frisk searches
based on less than probable cause of those persons reasonably stopped for suspicion of
criminal activity because of the governmental law enforcement need to protect the
against an 'objective standard,' whether this be probable cause or a less stringent test."). Professor
LaFave describes the quantum of evidence that constitutes probable cause as "somewhere between
bare suspicion and proof beyond a reasonable doubt." W. LAFAVE, supra note 27, at 184. The
information must "warrant a man of reasonable caution to reach these conclusions." Id.
'"Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
123 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). Professor Amsterdam lists three categories
of exceptions: "consent searches, a very limited class of routine searches, and certain searches
conducted under circumstances of haste that render the obtaining of a search v. arrant impractica-
ble." Amsterdam, supra note 19, at 358. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222
(1973) (consent of suspect); Chime] v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (searches incident to
lawful arrest); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (plain view); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) (hot pursuit); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 (exigent
circumstances).
124 Camara, 387 U.S. at 532.
' 25 Id.
126 See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 n.18. The Terry Court stated, "[Obis demand for specificity in
the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence." Id.
122
 Amsterdam, supra note 19, at 358.
128 Camara, 387 U.S. at 530 ("It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of
criminal behavior.").
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searcher.' 29 Similarly, the Court has upheld housing code inspections based on less than
the traditional individualized probable cause standard because of the important govern-
mental need to enforce minimum health and safety housing code regulations.'" Thus,
the Court has upheld practices directed at certain unique problems that the government
could not address adequately under the usual fourth amendment limitations.
The departure from traditional fourth amendment search protections finds its
theoretical underpinnings in the 1966 case of Camara v. Municipal Court."' The Supreme
Court in Camara upheld periodic municipal safety inspections of dwellings without the
traditional quantum of individualized probable cause as to conditions in any specific
dwelling.' 32 The Court reasoned that the city would not be able to accomplish an ac-
ceptable level of code enforcement under the traditional probable cause standard.'"
Significantly, the Camara Court held that a balancing process, weighing the degree
of intrusion into the personal privacy and dignity that attends a periodic inspection
against the need to search, would determine the level of suspicion or probable cause
required in these circumstances. 131 Using this balancing approach, the Court found that
an area search without specific information as to a particular building could be reason-
able. 195 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court later refused to adopt a balancing test to
determine the necessary level of antecedent justification to search in all cases.'" The
129 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. The Court in Terry created an exception to both the warrant and
probable cause requirements to permit brief seizures of the person for investigation and a frisk for
weapons incident to the stop. Id. The Court stated, "we cannot blind ourselves to the need for law
enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations
where they may lack probable cause to arrest." Id. at 24. The Court limited the search, however, to
a search for weapons and limited the search further to that which is necessary to discover a weapon
— a limited search of the outer clothing. Id. at 24-26.
15° Camara, 387 U.S. at 535-37. See infra notes 131-46 and accompanying text.
131 387 U.S. 523 (1966).
in Id. at 534.
"3 Id. at 536.
154 Id. at 536-37. Professors Gianelli and Gilligan conclude that the Court in recent years has
altered the balancing components in Camara — the "need to search" and "the invasion which the
search entails" — to balance "the public interest" against "the individual's right to personal security
free from arbitrary interference by law officers." Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note 60, at 1070 n.I67
(quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). As they point out, the indi-
vidual's interest has thus replaced the scope of the invasion or intrusion "in the balancing calculus."
Id. The Court in Winston appears to have confirmed this replacement, describing the balancing
components as the state's need for the evidence and the extent of the intrusion on the individual's
privacy interests. Winston, 470 U.S. at 763.
15 Camara, 387 U.S. at 538. The "persuasive factors" in the balance included the Court's finding
of a long history of judicial and public acceptance of such inspections, the strong public stake in
preventing or abating dangerous conditions and the government's inability to achieve acceptable
results by any other technique, and the "relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy"
where the inspections were non-personal and non-criminal in nature. Id. at 537. At least one
commentator has noted that the reasoning behind the first factor is questionable — long standing
acceptance easily could be a reflection of long standing acquiescence. W. LAFAVE, supra note 27, at
185. For a discussion of the weaknesses inherent in Camara's three persuasive factors, see id. at
185-89. Professor LaFave describes the "long history of judicial and public acceptance" as "vulner-
able from the point of view of both accuracy and cogency." Id. at 185.
16 See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979). The Court in Dunaway stated,
"protections intended by the Framers could all too easily disappear in the consideration and
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Court did employ thereafter the Camara balancing approach in upholding a variety of
other searches incident to traditional governmental regulatory functions.'"
Despite the Camara Court's relaxed balancing approach to determine the level of
antecedent justification necessary to conduct what have come to be known as "inspec-
tions" or "regulatory searches,"'" the Camara Court insisted on measures that would
ensure that fourth amendment interests were protected in these cases. Most importantly,
the administrative dwelling search contemplated by the Court in Camara required a
warrant,'" even if the level of suspicion necessary to support that warrant was less than
probable cause for a particular building.ko The Camara Court envisioned that the in-
spection warrant would issue pursuant to "reasonable legislative or administrative stan-
dards" for conducting an area inspection."' Thus, a magistrate authorizing a search or
a reviewing court would look for an established inspection policy and then decide
whether the authority exercised in a particular case was consistent with that policy. 142
Moreover, the inspections contemplated by the Camara Court could occur only if
the city followed procedures to ensure that it chose those subject to search on the basis
of neutral criteria. Most importantly, the Court noted that the searches were nonper-
sonal; everyone in the area would be subject to search) ." The Court stated that the
nonpersonal nature of the health and welfare searches would lessen their intrusiveness. 144
In addition, the Court in Camara stipulated that the warrant would be "suitably
restricted." 145 In contrast to criminal investigations, the inspections in Camara were
"housekeeping inspections" 146 designed to ensure compliance with the housing code and
thereby detect and prevent fire, health, safety, and sanitation hazards.' 47 In other words,
the searches were primarily preventative and not for the purpose of gathering evidence
expressly in anticipation of criminal prosecution.
balancing of the multifarious circumstances presented by different cases .... A single, familiar
standard is essential to guide police officers." Id.
' 51 See, e.g.. United States v. Ramsay, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (upholding search of international
mail); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (upholding warrantless
inspection of premises with liquor licenses); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (upholding
statute authorizing warrantless inspection of underground and surface mines); Committee for Cl
Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (upholding warrantless urine screening of
army personnel); Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966) (upholding search of
international travelers).
158 See, e.g., W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 187 (1985).
139 Camara, 387 U.S. at 534. In fact Camara overturned the earlier decision in Frank v. Maryland,
which held that warrantless administrative inspections were constitutional. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
Under Frank, one who refused to admit the inspector could be convicted for his or her refusal. Id.
at 367. Camara allowed warrantless housing code inspections only in the event of an emergency.
Camara, 387 U.S. at 539.
' 4° Camara, 387 U.S. at 539.
14 ' Id. at 538.
' 4 ' See id.
143 /d. at 537.
"4 Id. Professor LaFave comments, "[a] routine inspection that is part of a periodic or area
inspection plan does not single out any one person as the object of official suspicion." W. LAFAvE.,
supra note 27, at 190. See also Tucker, 613 F. Supp. at 1130-31 (to reduce fears, prison should have
informed the prisoners that a substantial number of fellow inmates would be tested).
145 Camara, 387 U.S. at 539.
146 Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note 60, at 1083 n.242 and accompanying text.
147 Camara, 387 U.S. at 535.
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In sum, the Camara Court held that area-wide health and welfare inspections of
dwellings could be reasonable if the city conducted the inspections with a warrant' 48 and
if the searches were nonpersonal and noncriminal in nature. 149 Most importantly, Camara
ensured that administrative searches impinging on fourth amendment interests would
not be isolated from judicial scrutiny. Such searches would be initiated with judicial
approval and their validity would be capable of judicial review against a measurable
standard.
B. Reasonableness in the Context of Body Searches
Beyond the traditional threshold requirements of probable cause and warrants in
the criminal context and their less stringent substitutes in the administrative search area,
the Court in Schmerber v. California considered other factors for determining reasonable-
ness where the governmental invasion intrudes upon an individual's interests in bodily
integrity, human dignity, and privacy.' 80
 In Schmerber the Court addressed the reason-
ableness of extracting a blood sample without a warrant from an unconsenting criminal
defendant to detect intoxication.'" The Court recognized that the standard fourth
amendment protections of probable cause and warrants would be the minimal require-
ments for reasonableness, reasoning that bodily intrusions necessitate informed, de-
tached, and deliberate determinations prior to search. 182 The Court in Schmerber consid-
ered the level of likelihood that intoxication would be found,'" the extent of the intrusion
upon the individual's personal privacy and bodily integrity, 154 the manner of the blood
extraction,'" and the effectiveness of the test performed.' 56
148 Id. at 534.
149 Id. at 537. The Camara Court stated that "inspections are neither personal in nature nor
aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime" — that is, accusatory in nature. Id. If a search yielded
illegality, however, such as illegal drugs, a criminal prosecution could follow. If the government
had obtained the evidence constitutionally, the prosecution could use the evidence. United States
v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1277-78 (5th Cir. 1973). The District of Columbia Circuit Court
described the primary purpose of the military urinalysis searches as health and welfare: lajny
punitive actions that might subsequently follow are incidental." Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway,
518 F.2d 466, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
'" 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1965). For a discussion of Schmerber, see supra notes 41-46 and
accompanying text. The Court stated that "[b]ecause we are dealing with intrusions into the human
body rather than with State interferences with property relationships or private papers — 'houses,
papers, and effects' — we write on a clean slate." Id. See also Winston, where the Court stated that
beyond the ordinary requirements of the fourth amendment, "Schmerber's inquiry considered a
number of other factors in determining the 'reasonableness' of the blood test." 470 U.S. at 761.
is' Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-71.
162 Id. at 770. Because probable cause to arrest preceded the blood test, the only fourth
amendment protection lacking in Schmerber was the existence of a warrant. Id. Although the Court
held that the threatened destruction of evidence created exigent circumstances permitting a warrant
exception, it stressed that the fourth amendment requires search warrants where intrusions into
the body are concerned. Id.
L59 Id. at 768-70.
"4 Id. at 771.
1 " Id.
136 Id. The Court also looked at the reasonableness of a warrantless search under the circum-
stances and found that the metabolism of blood alcohol created exigencies which permitted a
warrantless search. Id. at 770-71. See also Bell, for very similar guidelines in the analysis of body
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In response to these inquiries the Court emphasized significant factors that led to
the conclusion that the blood extraction search in Schmerber was reasonable. First, the
likelihood of discovering the evidence of intoxication sought was substantial. The police
officers had arrested Schmerber, based upon probable cause, for driving while intoxi-
cated. 157 Second, the Court found that the procedure did not significantly impose upon
the individual's sense of personal privacy and security. The Court considered blood
extractions commonplace in a society where individuals routinely are asked to give blood
samples.' 58 Third, medical personnel performed the extraction in a hospital setting. 159
Finally, the Court found that extraction of blood samples for chemical analysis is a highly
effective method of determining the degree of alcohol content in a person's blood. 16°
Almost twenty years after Schmerber, in Winston v. Lee, the Court reemphasized the
concerns of the Court in Schmerber in evaluating the reasonableness of a state order to
compel a criminal defendant to undergo a surgical operation to remove a bullet from
his body. 161 The Court in Winston expressly adopted a Schmerber framework of analysis.' 62
The Court in Winston, in concluding that the surgical search was unreasonable, placed
particular emphasis on the state's possession of substantial evidence which vitiated the
need to surgically recover the bullet.'" In sum, the principal inquiries upon which the
cavity searches: "Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which
it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted." 441 U.S.
at 559.
157 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768. Schmerber and a companion had struck a tree with a car that
Schmerber was "apparently driving" Id. at 758 n.2. The police arrested Schmerber while he was
receiving treatment at the hospital. Id.
158 Id. at 771. The Court noted that individuals routinely are asked to give blood samples upon
entering the military, applying for a marriage license, or undergoing a periodic physical exam. Id.
at 771 n.13. As the Court later stated in Winston, "[i]ntrusions ... (which] damage the individual's
sense of personal privacy and security .. are thus subject to the Fourth Amendment's dictates... .
Schmerber recognized society's judgment that blood tests do not constitute an unduly extensive
imposition on an individual's personal privacy and bodily integrity." 470 U.S. at 762. Compare with
Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25 (limited search of outer clothing for weapons is likely to be an annoying,
frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience).
' 59 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. The Court noted that:
We are thus not presented with the serious questions which would arise if a search
involving use of a medical technique, even of the most rudimentary sort, were made
by other than medical personnel or in other than a medical environment — for
example, if it were administered by police in the privacy of the stationhouse. To
tolerate searches under these conditions might be to invite an unjustified element of
personal risk of infection and pain.
Id. at 771-72. See also Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 (where the search is conducted is an important factor
in evaluating the reasonableness of a search).
168 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
161 470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985).
162 Id. at 760. As in Schmerber, the Winston Court stressed the necessity of prior deliberation and
authorization to search in the form of probable cause and a warrant. Id. at 760-61. Furthermore,
the Court looked to the likelihood that the search would produce evidence of crime, id. at 759, the
extent of the intrusion on the defendant's privacy interests, id. at 761, and the manner of extracting
the bullet, id. at 763-65. In addition, the Court looked to the state's need, in the face of all the
other evidence gathered, to recover the bullet. Id. at 765. Indeed, throughout the entire fact and
background section of the opinion, the Court refers to Schmerber. See id. at 755 (opinion begins with
description of Schmerber facts); id. at 759-63 (opinion outlines Sehmerber's concerns).
16' Id. at 765-66.
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Court focused in Schmerber are important to the evaluation of the reasonableness of
searches which intrude upon human body, privacy, and dignity interests.'"
C. Reasonableness of Urinalysis Searches in the Prison Setting
The lone Supreme Court prison person search decision, Bell v. Wolfish, provides
little guidance as to what factors indicate reasonableness in the prison setting." 5 Bell did
establish, however, that prison officials routinely can search prisoners' persons without
the traditional fourth amendment requirements for reasonableness — warrants and
probable cause — that obtain in a criminal search situation." 6 In Bell, the Court held
that a prison could conduct warrantless, visual body cavity searches on a routine basis
following the person's contact with visitors from outside the prison on less than probable
cause. 167 In reaching this decision, however, the Court failed to elaborate as to when or
under what conditions such searches could he lawful. 168 The Court did comment, how-
ever, that the manner of search should be reasonable, citing Schmerber v. California. 169 I
addition, the Court noted that courts must conduct the reasonableness inquiry in a spirit
of "wide ranging" deference to prison officials in the adoption and implementation of
policies needed to preserve prison security.'"
Because the prison searched the prisoners in Bell after contact with visitors, 171 Bell
arguably leaves open the question of whether courts should uphold periodic prison
searches of the person not based on probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or even contact
with outsiders, but rather on a generalized, unit-wide security concern.'" The mere fact
of contact with outsiders in Bell supplies at least minimal cause to suspect that the prisoner
"I See infra notes 177-90 for a discussion of cases that apply Schmerber considerations to the
evaluation of' the reasonableness of urine searches.
165 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979). The Court merely stated that a visual body cavity "inspection"
must be conducted in a reasonable manner." Id. Searches of cells and belongings therein are not
covered by the fourth amendment, and thus traditional fourth amendment protections are not
applicable. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 525-26, 528 n.8. The Court in Bell commented, "even the most
zealous advocate of prisoners' rights would not suggest that a warrant is required to conduct such
a (cell] search." Bell, 44I U.S. at 557.
"6 Bell, 441 U.S. at 558-60.
167 Id. at 560.
168 Id. As the federal district court in Storms noted:
The details of this balancing process [to determine reasonableness] were left unstated
in Bell. Lower courts are left to reason from the ultimate holding: a prisoner's Fourth
Amendment expectation of privacy does not extend so far as to shield him or her
from a humiliating body cavity search following a contact visit ... whether or not
there is a basis independent of the mere fact of the visit to suspect the prisoner of
smuggling contraband.
Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1219.
'0 Id. (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-72). See supra notes 150-64 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Schmerber. The New York federal district court in Storms viewed Bell's reference
to Schmerber as express approval of the Schmerber reasonable manner requirement. Storms, 600 F.
Supp. at 1219.
170 Bell, 441 U.S. at 547. Accord Tucker, 613 F. Supp. at 1128 (Court in Bell "held that the basic
test is one of 'reasonableness").
171 Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
12
 See Note, Body Searches, supra note 67, at 1037.
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may be carrying contraband. 173 Outsiders are possible drug or weapon sources. 174 Never-
theless, the courts that have addressed the issue of what fourth amendment protections
should obtain when prisons implement urinalysis programs agree that prison officials
reasonably can search prisoners without warrants and based on no showing of particular
facts that the individual to be searched has aroused probable cause or any articulable
level of suspicion."N In 1984, the New York federal district court in Storms v. Coughlin
concluded that if the minimal level of suspicion in Bell — contact with visitors — could
support routine person searches, then the judicially noted drug problem prevalent
amongst prisoners generally could support wholly random urine testing if conducted in
a reasonable manner." 6
1 " Id. at 1052. Consistent with the Bell holding are searches of the person undertaken under
a policy of routinely searching prisoners without probable cause when they enter incarceration,
United States v. Morin, 378 F.2d 472, 475 (2d Cir. 1967), before transfer to another institution,
Cline v. United States, 116 F2d 275, 276 (5th Cir. 1940) (per curiam), after return from certain
work areas, Smith v. State, 1 Md. App. 297, 300, 229 A.2d 723, 725 (1967), before and after
conference visits with attorneys, Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 624 (7th Cir. 1973), and before
transfer to the custody of a marshal for court appearances, Daughtery v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292, 294
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 914 U.S. 872 (1973). All of these routine searches represent situations in
which the prisoner's contact with outsiders increases the chances of finding contraband on the
prisoner. As one commentator argues, the governmental interest in suspecting and preventing the
influx of drugs may be strongest at the point of entry. Note, Body Searches, supra note 67, at 1054.
Internal searches conducted on prisoners who have had no contact with the outside and who were
presumably searched on previous occasions — that is, after contact with visitors — are much less
likely to yield drugs. Id. See, e.g., Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609, 617 (7th Cir. 1980) (court viewed
strip searches conducted before and after non-contact visits with particular concern, although court
did not dispose of reasonableness issue), on remand, 527 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D. Ill. 1980). A recent
Washington case, however, upheld a pat-down search of a prisoner without any suspicion, pursuant
to prison regulations permitting a guard to conduct a pat-down of a prisoner at any time. State v.
Baker, 28 Wash. App. 423, 424-25, 623 P.2d 1132, 1172-73 (1981).
14 Note, Body Searches, supra note 67, at 1052.
See, e.g., Tucker, 613 F. Supp. at 1128 (court would permit testing if practice served security,
order, and discipline objectives, was not an exaggerated response to legitimate institutional needs,
arid if it reflected an informed judgment of prison administrators); Storms,  600 F. Supp. at 1220-
21 (court would permit testing if selection procedure completely random); Jensen, 589 F. Supp. at
36-39 (upholding program of random urinalysis testing); Hampson, 319 N.W.2d at 799 (upholding
search program where conducted with notice, in an infirmary); Ewing v. State, 160 Ind. App. 138,
199, 310 N.E.2d 571, 578 (1974) (en bane) (upholding warrantless testing of probationer under
"emergency doctrine"). But cf. W. LAFAvE, supra note 27, at 407. Professor LaFave doubts that a
prison could subject all inmates to blood sample testing as a means of determining which inmates
were taking drugs.
One state court decision holds that the government can subject probationers to urinalysis
searches based on a destruction or dissipation of evidence rationale. Ewing, 160 Ind. App. at 149,
310 N.E.2d at 578 (en bane). As one commentator points out, in the prison setting, the argument
that prisons are dangerous and are thus continuing emergency situations fails to consider that it
may well be that at least some areas in the "free world" pose as much constant danger as the prison.
Singer, supra note 60, at 68.
' 76 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1220-21 (S.D.N.V. 1989). The Storms court reasoned that the body cavity
searches in Bell were "very nearly gratuitous," where the prison searched visitors before the visit,
required prisoners to wear one-piece jumpsuits which zipped up the front, and visits took place in
a glass-enclosed room under officer surveillance. The Storms court noted that "filn order to lodge
contraband in an anal or vaginal cavity, the prisoner would plainly be required to disrobe from the
waist up while under the gaze of guards. There was virtually no possibility that contraband would
be found .... The random urinalyses at Ossining seem more likely to turn up evidence of miscon-
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Beyond the threshold determination that prisons can conduct wholly random body
searches of prisoners without probable cause and warrants, courts have set forth the
basic contours of a reasonable urinalysis search based primarily on the factors which
indicate reasonableness in the Schmerber Court's evaluation of blood extraction
searches.'" The Schmerber considerations most important to the reasonableness of uri-
nalysis testing include the extent of the intrusion upon the individual's personal privacy
and bodily integrity, the manner of the urine testing, and the effectiveness of the test
performed.' 78 For example, the federal district court in Storms v. Coughlin expressly
adopted a Schmerber reasonableness analysis. 19 In support of its use of the Schmerber
analysis, the Storms court described urinalysis tests as analogous to the blood tests con-
ducted in Schmerber in their intrusiveness upon both bodily integrity and privacy and
dignity interests where the search as conducted involves intimate bodily functions.'" In
addition, the Storms court noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Bell, upholding
body cavity searches of prisoners,' 81 expressly approved the Schmerber reasonableness
manner requirement.'" Similarly, the federal district court in Tucker v. Dickey looked to
the manner of testing and scope of the intrusion)" factors of the Schmerber decision.'"
1. The Manner of Urinalysis Testing as it Reflects upon Reasonableness
Both the Storms and Tucker courts found the extent of the invasion from urinalysis
upon the individual's privacy interests significant, deeming urinalysis tests as equivalent
to the intrusion involved in both body cavity and blood searches.'" Given this important
duct ...." Id. at 1220. The dissent in Bell pointed out the gratuitious nature of the Bell searches
when it criticized the majority's finding that justification existed to uphold wholly random searches.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 577-78 (Marshall, j., dissenting). Professor LaFave agrees with the dissent in Bell
and questions the majority's showing that there was a sufficient security risk that warranted "such
Draconian measures." W. LAFAVE, supra note 27, at 217-18 (1985 Supp.). Ironically, the Storms
court then cited the Bell dissent's criticism to uphold random searches at Ossining. Storms, 600 F.
Supp. at 1220 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 577-78).
'" See, e.g., Tucker, 613 F. Supp at 1130; Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1218; Hampson, 319 N.W.2d at
799-800.
'" See supra notes 151-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Schmerber considera-
tions. The likelihood of discovering the evidence sought is an additional concern in Schmerber. See
supra note 157 and accompanying text. This factor is of lessened importance in the prison context
because the Supreme Court in Bell upheld body cavity searches of prisoners based on the arguably
minimal chance of finding contraband. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
178 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
'" Id. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
182 Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1219. See also Tucker, 613 F. Supp. at 1128 (Court in Bell "held that
the basic test is one of 'reasonableness'").
'" 613 F. Supp. 1124, 1129-30 (D. Wis. 1985). See also Hampson, 319 N.W.2d at 799-800
(quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771) (looks to effectiveness and manner of testing prongs of
Schmerber, finding manner of testing reasonable where urine tests involve no risk, trauma, or pain).
184 Tucker, 613 F. Su pp. at 1129-30. The Tucker court cited Bell as commanding an inquiry into
the scope of the intrusion on personal rights. Id. at 1129 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 559). The court
quoted directly, however, the analysis of the Storms court in which Storms looked to Schmerber. Id.
(quoting Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1218, 1220 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70)). As the Storms
court noted, the Supreme Court in Bell did not state the details of its balancing process, leaving the
lower courts to reason from its holding only. Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1219.
See Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1218 (analogous to blood tests); id, at 1220 (entitled to the same
level of scrutiny accorded to body cavity searches); Tucker, 613 F. Supp. at 1129-30 (quoting Storms
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underlying consideration, the Storms and Tucker courts focused particular attention on
the manner of testing prong of the Schmerber decision, looking at how many guards or
fellow prisoners could view the testing,'" what time of day the prison searched the
prisoner, 187 and whether the prison provided the prisoner notice of the search and its
purpose.' 88 According to the Storms court, if these searches were conducted in the view
of anyone other than the testing officer, including fellow prisoners, when there is no
legitimate security need to do so, they would be unreasonable.'" Similarly, courts have
looked at the reasonableness of the manner of urinalysis programs based partly upon
the location in which the prison officer conducts the searches and whether that location
ensures maximum privacy.'" The Tucker court found a genuine issue of fact withstanding
a grant of summary judgment as to whether the manner in which the prison searched
the plaintiff-prisoner violated his rights when the prison never informed the prisoners
of a drug testing program, the prisoner was awakened at five a.m., and the guard merely
handed him a note explaining the proceedings and told him to urinate into a container.m
In addition, courts that have focused on the reasonableness of the prison's manner
of testing have stressed concerns that were of significant importance in the Supreme
Court's departure from traditional fourth amendment protections in the area of the
administrative search. The Court in Camara v. Municipal Court held that area-wide health
and welfare inspections of dwellings could be reasonable if conducted with a warrant
analysis). The Storms court recognized that debate as to which search is more degrading differs as
to degree, not kind. Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1220. The court stated that "[bloth are degrading. It is
this basic offense to human dignity, rather than any particular style of causing offense, which sets
this type of search apart from traditional types." Id. Accordingly, the court deemed the prisoners'
response to the tests as "extremely negative." Id. at 1222.
186 See, e.g., Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1222. See also Denike v. Fauver, No. 83-2737, slip op. at 1-
2 (D.N.J. April 16, 1984). See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
187 See, e.g., Tucker, 613 F. Supp. at 1130-31. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
188 See, e.g., Tucker, 613 F. Supp. at 1130-31.
189 Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1222. The prisoners in Storms had alleged that the prison forced
them to urinate in the presence of others and that members of the opposite sex who passed the
bathroom where the searches were conducted could view the tests. Id. at 1224. The court credited
the state's testimony that the prison conducted the searches in the presence of the testing officer
only. Id. Nevertheless, the court commented that the state's attempt to show that it always conducted
tests in the presence of one officer only was in effect an admission that security demands did not
require that snore than one testing officer conduct the search. Id. at 1222. Similarly, the Bell dissent
found it significant that the prison conducted the body cavity searches upheld by the majority in
the presence of other inmates because of time pressures. Bell, 441 U.S. at 577 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). See also Denike, No. 83-2737, slip op. at 1-2 (D.N.j. April 6, 1984) (order dismissing
with prejudice a prisoner's claim against the New Jersey department of corrections stipulated that
prison must conduct urine testing in presence of officer of the same sex).
' 90 See, e.g., Tucker, 613 F. Supp. at 1130-31 (manner of testing questionable when prison guard
awakened and directed prisoner, while still in his cell, to urinate into a container); Storms, 600 F.
Supp. at 1216-17 (prison conducted tests in restroom hospital section of prison, in a corner urinal
where passerby could not view the searches); Hampson, 319 N.W.2d at 799 (infirmary officials
conducted tests in the infirmary). See also Kane v. Fair, Civ. No. 136229, slip op. at 8 (Super. Ct.
Mass. Aug. 5, 1983) (injunction of prison's existing program on due process grounds required,
among other protections, that prison test prisoners only in infirmary or place of maximum privacy).
191 Tucker, 613 F. Supp. at 1130-31. The prison in Tucker instituted drug testing to study the
prisoners' drug use and develop a policy. Id. at 1126. The testing thus would be anonymous and
not used for disciplinary proceedings. Id. Tucker, however, was convicted at a disciplinary hearing
for refusing to take the test. Id. at 1127.
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and if nonpersonal and noncriminal in nature.' 92 The Camara Court stated that the
warrant would insure detached deliberation by a judicial officer prior to search, provide
'mike to the party searched of the appropriate limits of the searcher's authority, and
limit the discretion of the searcher. 193
Courts evaluating the reasonableness of urinalysis programs have not cited Camara
but have stressed concerns identical to those raised in Camara: who has discretion to
authorize and conduct searches,' 44 what is the objective of the program as imple-
mented,'" does the prison search the prisoners in a random, nonpersonal fashion,' 96
and does the prison give notice of the tests to prisoners.' 97 For example, the federal
district court in Storms concluded that the prison's urinalysis program was unreasonable
because the prison could not demonstrate that its procedure was truly random.'" In the
Storms prison, the watch commander "randomly" chose cards inscribed with the prisoners'
names from a bulletin board to which all the cards were pinned.'" As the court noted,
a guard could quite unconsciously pick the less-fav4red inmates for these "random"
searches. 2" In addition to the potential for conscious or unconscious abuse, the court
found this procedureoffensive when readily available alternatives existed."' The court
'"2 387 U.S. 523, 534, 537 (1967). Although the courts have riot expressly categorized these
searches as administrative in nature, commentators agree that the exception to the traditional
fourth amendment requirements in the area of prison searches is based upon both Camara and
Terry (discussed supra note 129 and accompanying text). See, e.g., Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note
60, at 1083 ("The doct.Tinale basis for regulating prison searches is supplied by Camara"); W. LAFAVE,
supra note 27, at 405 ("under the Camara-Terry balancing test, a search of the person of a particular
prisoner might be justified"); W. LAFAVE Sc J. ISRAEL, supra note 138, at 198 (under the Camara
standardized procedures principle, prison can conduct routine or periodic searches); Singer, supra
note 60, at 681 ("application of the Camara-See doctrines to prison might allow a prison to obtain a
standing ... search warrant" to search "every X number of days").
197
	
387 U.S. at 534, 537. For a discussion of Camara, see supra notes 131-49 and
accompanying text.
' 94 See, e.g., Tucker, 613 F. Supp. at 1128 (practice must be an informed judgment of prison
administrators); Storm.s, 600 F. Supp. at 1223 (tests must be truly random — prison cannot allow
searcher consciously or unconsciously to pick less favored inmates).
195 See, e.g., Tucker, 613 F. Supp at 1128 (tests must serve the needs of the institution for security,
order, and discipline); Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1223 (prison may not use tests to harass; prison must
choose a selection procedure that serves legitimate security purpose); Denike, No. 83-2737, slip op.
at 4 (D.N.J. April 6, 1984) (order stipulating dismissal requires corrections department to continue
"to provide by standard that urine monitoring shall not be conducted as a means of punishment
or discipline").
196 See, e.g., Storms, 600 F. Supp at 1223 (searches must be truly random); Denike, No. 83-2737,
slip op. at 3-4 (D.N.J. April 6, 1989) (prison must base searches on reasonable suspicion or search
all prisoners).
197 See, e.g., Tucker, 613 F. Supp. at 1130-31 (manner of testing potentially unreasonable where
prison did not inform prisoners of program in advance); Denike, No. 83-2737, slip op. at 4 (D.N.J.
April 6, 1984) (order stipulating dismissal requires that only experienced corrections officers of
high rank could order all prisoners to be tested); Hampson, 319 N.W.2d at 799 (test reasonable
where prison notifies prisoner a day in advance of a scheduled urine testing).
"8 Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1223.
Id. The state argued that the guard chose cards "with no thought given to the identity of
the prisoner selected." Id.
°° Id, The court stated "[blecause these tests involve both embarrassment and potential for
punishment there is ... the possibility of their abuse for purposes of harassment. In particular,
prisoners may be targeted for testing simply to harass them." Id.
2 ° 1 Id. The court noted one simple alternative would be to put the cards into a box and draw
them out blindly. Id.
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concluded that prisoners were entitled to a preliminary injunction enjoining the prison
from its method of selecting prisoners.'" A similar concern with the discretionary power
to subject prisoners to urine searches is evident in Denike v. Fauver, where a New Jersey
federal district court ordered dismissal of a claim against the New Jersey Department of
Corrections. 203 The Denike court stipulated that the Department of Corrections was
required to submit to testing only prisoners who had aroused a "reasonable factual basis"
for suspicion or to submit all prisoners to testing. 204
 The stipulation required that only
experienced corrections officers of high rank could order that all prisoners be tested
and these officers could not delegate this authority. 20
 In addition, the court required
that the order be in writing. 2°6
 The stipulation also required that the Department would
"continue to provide by standard that urine monitoring shall not be conducted as a
means of punishment or discipline" unless part of a disciplinary sanction. 207
The Tucker court's evaluation of the reasonableness of the urinalysis program fo-
cused on the lack of notice to the prisoners of the drug testing program, which the
prison implemented to study the prison's drug problem.l"H The court reasoned that
advance notice of the existence of the testing could have informed the prisoner who was
awakened at five a.m. in his cell of the purposes of the testing and that a substantial
number of his fellow inmates also would be giving samples, making clear that the prison
official had not singled out the prisoner for significantly intrusive testing. 2" The North
Dakota Supreme Court upheld urine testing where the prison gave the inmates advance
warning the day before their scheduled testinr" and the penitentiary handbook set
forth rules governing the urine screening procedures and the disciplinary sanctions to
he i m posed .2"
In sum, courts have relied upon the manner-of-testing prong of the Schmerber
decision to evaluate whether the prison reasonably has conducted a urinalysis search of
202
 Id. at 1226.
203
	 83-2737 (D.N.J. April 6, 1984) (stipulation of dismissal with prejudice). Although the
stipulation did not cite case law support for its conclusions, considerations such as authority to
search and the preventative purposes of the search were fundamental factors supporting the Camara
departure from traditional fourth amendment limitations in the area of administrative searches.
See id. at 3-4.
20-9 Id.
20s
	 at 4.
206 Id.
'il>7
208 Tucker, 613 F. Stipp. at 1130. See also Hampson, 319 N.W.2d at 797 (testing reasonable where
inmates notified a day in advance of testing); Kane, Civ. No. 136229, slip op. at 8 (Super. Ct. Mass.
Aug. 5, 1983) (in enjoining prison from using existing drug screening procedure on due process
grounds, court ordered the prison to obtain future urine samples only after reasonable advance
notice). Although the Storms court did not discuss advance notice, the prison in Storms had an-
nounced the program to prisoners, assuming that knowledge of testing would lessen drug use.
Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1216. The Tucker court commented that the notice in Storms was noteworthy
because the Storms court upheld the random program, with the exception of its method of selection.
Tucker, 613 F. Supp. at 1131.
20" Tucker, 613 F. Supp. at 1130-31.
2 " Hampton, 319 N.W.2d at 797, 799. See also Kane, Civ. No. 136229, slip op. at 8 (Super. Ct.
Mass. Aug. 5, 1983) (in enjoining prison from using existing drug screening procedure on due
process ground, court ordered that future testing could take place provided prison obtains urine
sample after reasonable advance notice).
2 " Hampson, 613 F. Supp. at 799 n.2.
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a prisoner. These courts have viewed the location and timing of the testing and notice
to the prisoners as significant to this inquiry. In addition, courts have focused on concerns
expressed by the Camara Court, asking whether the prison adequately circumscribes
discretion to authorize and conduct searches, chooses prisoners in a random, nonper-
sonal fashion, and notifies prisoners of the implementation and purposes of testing.
2. The Reliability of Urinalysis Testing as it Reflects on Reasonableness Under the
Fourth Amendment
One court — the federal district court in Storms v. Coughlin — has looked to the
effectiveness of the procedure prong of the Schmerber decision and has evaluated the
reliability of the urinalysis testing equipment as an indication of the reasonableness of
the search. 212 The Court in Schmerber considered a blood extraction from a criminal
defendant reasonable in part because it viewed such testing as a highly effective means
of determining the degree to which a person is intoxicated. 213
 In addition to the Court's
reference in Schmerber to the importance of the effectiveness of the test employed, the
Court in Delaware v. Prouse found the stopping and searching of randomly selected
automobiles to be unconstitutional because "kin terms of [meeting the governmental
interest in discovering and deterring unlicensed drivers], the spot check did not appear
sufficiently productive to qualify as a reasonable law enforcement practice under the
fourteenth amendment."214 If the urinalysis device employed is unable to discern drug
use accurately and thus, it has the potential to inculpate the innocent and exculpate the
guilty, under Prouse it would appear that a urinalysis may not be a "sufficiently productive
mechanism to justify the intrusion upon fourth amendment interests" that such tests
entail.
In this vein and citing Schmerber, the Storms court evaluated the reliability of the
procedure to assess the reasonableness of the Ossining prison's urinalysis testing. 215 To
evaluate the reliability of the test, the Storms court looked to other courts' evaluation of
the reliability of urine-testing technology, in the context of prisoners' claims to denial of
due process under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. 215 The
Storms court found that evidence concerning the test's reliability did not warrant the
212
 See Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1221 ("The Schmerber Court, in analyzing reasonableness, looked
to the reliability of the test ... ").
213
 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. The Court, however, did not discuss at any length the reliability
of the testing involved therein. For a discussion of Schmerber, see supra notes 41-46 & 172-89.
214
	 U.S. 648,660 (1979).
Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1218,1221. The Storms prison used the Syva manufacturer's Enzyme
Multiplied Immunoassay Technique (hereinafter referred to as EMIT). The Syva Corporation is
based in Palo Alto, California. For a discussion of EMIT, see infra notes 224-50 and accompanying
text.
2 L6 Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1221-22. For a discussion of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, see supra note 69 and infra notes 218-22 and accompanying text. The Storms court
looked at Jensen, 589 F. Supp. 35 and Kane, Civ. No. 136229 (Super. Ct. Mass. Aug. 5, 1983). Storms,
600 F. Supp. at 1221. The Kane court concluded that the existing testing program was unreliable
and violative of the prisoner's rights to due process under the fourteenth amendment to 'the United
States Constitution. Kane, Civ. No. 136229, slip op. at 7 (Super. Ct. Mass. Aug. 5, 1983). The Jensen
court concluded that the existing program was not unreliable and hence did not violate the prisoner's
civil rights under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1982). Jensen, 589 F. Supp. at 38-39. Other courts which
have evaluated reliability in the context of claims of denial of due process include Higgs, 616 F.
Supp. 226; Tucker, 613 F. Supp. 1124, Wykoff, 613 F. Supp. 1504; Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. 1504.
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issuance of a preliminary injunction but did raise an issue of substance which prevented
the court from granting the defendant-prison's motion to dismiss. 2 " Given the Storms
court's analysis, however, the concerns raised by these courts with respect to the accuracy
of the testing may shed light on the assessment of the reasonableness under the fourth
amendment of a particular urinalysis program.
In determining whether a test is reliable under a due process analysis, the court
asks not simply whether the test is reliable, but whether the test is sufficiently reliable
such that its use as the basis for imposing sanctions against an individual does not offend
constitutional standards."' Judicial acceptance of a scientific theory or instrument can
only occur when the technology has "gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs. "219 This general rule assures that those experts most qualified in the
appropriate scientific community will have a "determinative voice." 220 The test need not
be proven infallible, and experts need not unanimously accept it, 22 ' yet there must not
be substantial doubts of the scientific devices' reliability and accuracy. 222
Although many methods in analytical drug screening technology are currently avail-
able,223 the Syva224 manufacturer's Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique (here-
inafter referred to as EMIT) is used widely in drug screening225 because the technique
is marketed as a urinalysis test to be performed on site by the prison's own personnel. 226
EMIT systems include all of the instrumentation and reagents needed to perform assays
for several groups of substances.227 Prison administrators particularly favor such on-site
testing because it is typically much less costly' to train and use prison employees than to
use outside laboratories. 228 In addition, the use of outside laboratories can delay the
receipt of test results and thereby undermine a stated goal of an effective disciplinary
217
	 600 F. Supp. at 1222.
218 Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. at 1507. The Peranzo court noted that courts must evaluate the concept
of "procedural adequacy" in light of the particular factual setting with which the state is concerned
— that is, a criminal or prison disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 1508. The Court in Wolff noted that
the full panoply of rights due a defendant in a [criminal prosecution]" does not apply to a prisoner
in a prison disciplinary proceeding. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556.
219 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
22° Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 202, 327 N.E.2d 671, 677 (1975).
221 Id. at 198, 327 N.E.2d at 675.
222 Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 270, 191 N.E.2d 479, 481 (1963). As one court
noted, optimal precision is not the constitutional norm, even when an individual's most fundamental
right to the accurate determination of guilt in a criminal trial is at stake. Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. at
1507.
223 See supra note 3.
224 Syva Corporation, Palo Alto, California.
229 For a 1983 non-inclusive list of Syva's customers, see Affidavit of Shenny Hitt at 2-4, Kane,
Civ. No. 136229 (Super. Ct. Mass. Aug. 5, 1983) (Hitt was deposed as the Market Manager for
Syva).
226 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. The EMIT literature states that because the
tests "do not require specially licensed personnel; subjective interpretation of results or special
handling techniques and safety precautions, they can be run by any trained staff member." Morgan,
supra note 6, at 306.
2" Divot' Sc Greenblatt, The Admissibility of Positive EMIT Results as Scientific Evidence: Counting
Facts, Not Heads, 51 CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY, 1 14, 115 (No. 2, April 1985).
228 Affidavit of George Vote at 3, Kane, Civ. No. 136229 (Super. Ct. Mass. Aug. 5, 1983). See
also Syva Systems and Services for On-Site Drug Detection, Pamphlet (1983 Syva Corp.) (on site
testing offers quick response time, is carried on by your own staff," can cut costs).
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system — the quick and efficient meting out of disciplinary sanctions. 222 In sum, EMIT
allows for large-scale screening by prison employees with readily available reagents and
instruments at a reasonable cost and with speed.
The EMIT relies on immunochemistry2" to detect the presence of various drugs in
the body fluids. 2" EMIT, in effect, measures changes in light absorbency in the test
fluids, once urine is added to the solution. 232 It does not measure the actual concentration
of the drug itself. 233 By means of a small computer which compares the substance in
question to known values, the device simply indicates on a card printout whether the
urine contains the drug in question. 234
A major source of criticism of the test, as with all scientific techniques relied upon
to produce positive or negative indications, is the margin of error reflected in the test's
false-positive rate — in other words, the percentage of tests that read positive even
though no illicit substance is present in the urine. 233 Although the cause of most false-
positives is unknown, the manufacturer and the scientific community at large do not
dispute their existence, and contention thus arises as to how wide the margin of error
actually 15.256 Because the test does not directly measure the concentration of drugs in
229 Affidavit of George Vose at 3, Kane, Civ. No. 136229 (Super. Ct. Mass. Aug. 5, 1983).
2 s0 See supra note 4.
251 For a good description of the immunoassay method see Morgan, supra note 6, at 306-08.
See also Divoll & Greenblatt, supra note 227, at 115. In brief, Doctors Morgan, Divoll, and Greenblatt
describe the process as follows: an animal is injected with a drug to provoke the animal to produce
immune chemicals, or antibodies. The antibodies will then bind to the drug. The antibodies
subsequently are harvested from the animal's blood. An enzyme then is attached to the drug of
interest, producing a drug-enzyme complex which is inactivated as a functional enzyme when the
animal's drug antibody is placed in the same solution. The antibodies are added to the enzyme
solution and the enzyme therefore is inactivated. If, however, a urine sample is added to the
inactivated enzyme solution and the urine sample contains the drug in question, then the antibody
will bind the free drug in the sample and bind less of the drug-enzyme complex. Any unbound
drug-enzyme then becomes active. It in turn dissolves bacteria in suspension in the solution and
clears the solution. A spectrophotometer then measures the clearing as a change in absorbence of
light. Morgan, supra note 6, at 306-08; Divoll & Greenblatt, supra note 227, at 115.
292 See infra note 265.
299 Morgan, supra note 6, at 306. Dr. Morgan analogizes the use of a polygraph device, where
variations in physiological measurements "may be viewed as if they were a reflection of lying," id.
(emphasis in original), to urine screening. Dr. Morgan notes, "[ujrine cannot be peered into to see
the tiny components of a dissolved drug. Techniques and manipulations are used that reflect and
amplify some character of the drug molecule." Id. In the prison setting, the test's inability to
determine how much or when a drug was taken is of diminished importance, because the use of a
drug at any time may not be considered acceptable. The amount of the drug ingested, however,
perhaps should be relevant to the proportionality of the disciplinary sanction imposed. Peranzo, 608
F. Supp. at 1511 n.13.
294 Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. at 1505.
295 As Dr. Morgan points out, there is some controversy surrounding the definition of the term
"false positive." Morgan, supra note 6, at 309. Proponents prefer to use the words "unconfirmed
positive." Id.
235 According to one writer, reports of inaccuracies in marijuana testing range from 1-50
percent. Zeese, supra note 3, at 25. Mr. Zeese cites several studies, including those conducted by
Syva. Id. at 26. Dr. Morgan surveys the results of several studies, including those conducted by the
United States Armed Services. Morgan, supra note 6, at 309-13. A proferred source of the tests'
false-positive rate is the degree of specificity of the immunoassay, or the accuracy of the technology
in identifying a particular drug. See id. at 309 ("The greatest defect of immunoassays is their lack
of specificity.").
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body fluids and instead relies on immunochemical reactions, a proferred source of the
test's false-positive rate is the possibility that other substances may show cross-reactivity. 237
Cross-reactivity occurs when the device mistakes a substance similar in structure to the
drug being measured for the tested drug. 238 Studies indicate that certain prescription
analgesic drugs and even over-the-counter cough medicines may create false-positives. 239
A cross-reactive substance in the sample always will produce a false-positive, and hence
retesting a sample with the same immunoassay technique will not confirm a positive
readout."0 Thus, retesting most likely will correct for human error, but it will not affect
machine-generated error."'
Although the studies vary widely as to their findings regarding EMIT's false-positive
rate — 2.3 to 25 percent242 — the manufacturer, 24 ' and its proponents — courtroom
experts defending the use of the test 244 — consistently note that where tests will affect
substantial rights, the test should be "confirmed," whether by use of the same device
or an alternative technology, preferably not based on immunochemistry.245 Ironically,
29'
	 discussions of cross-reactivity and causes generally, see Morgan, supra note 6, at 309;
Divoll & Greenblatt, supra note 227, at 115; McBay, supra note 3, at 38; Zeese, supra note 3, at 26.
298
	 Zeese, supra note 3, at 26. See generally articles cited supra note 237.
"9 Morgan, supra note 6, at 309. See also Zeese, supra note 3, at 26 (lists eleven cross-reactive
substances from a Syva study, including aspirin).
24° Zeese, supra note 3, at 26.
241 Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1225. False positives also may occur in some individuals because they
excrete large amounts of endogenous lysozyme or malate dehydrogenase. Morgan, supra note 6, at
312. The EMIT manufacturer acknowledges these problems and cautions that operators run a
blank with all positive tests employing either of these two enzymes. Id. Dr. Morgan also cites a 1982
Syva study which attributes false-positives to carry-overs following a strongly positive preceding
sample. Id. at 309. See also Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. at 1505 n. 5 (defendant-prison's expert witness
testified that failure to adhere to manufacturer's instructions as to temperature conditions may
produce false-positives).
242
 Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. at 1511. See generally studies cited supra note 237.
245 The Higgs court cites a March 1983 booklet prepared by Syva entitled Frequently Asked
Questions About Syva & Drug Abuse Testing, which provides lilt is good scientific practice to confirm
a positive result from any test method in cases where a person's rights, privileges, treatment or
employment is at stake." Higgs, 616 F. Supp. at 229. Commentators also cite Syva's suggestion that
an alternative method of testing confirm EMIT tests. See, e.g., MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY
REPORT, Urine Testing for Detection of Marijuana: An Advisory, 469, 469 (Sept. 16, 1983) [hereinafter
MMWR]; Zeese, supra note 3, at 25.
2" See, e.g., Higgs, 616 F. Supp. at 229 (defendant-prison expert testified that another test
should back up single EMIT tests although expert did not feel this was necessary with prisoners);
Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. at 1510 (defendant-prison expert testified "I definitely believe that there
should be a confirmation").
245 As the court in Kane noted,
to permit a man to be found guilty of a serious offense on the basis of evidence from
a machine, when the manufacturer itself concedes the device requires outside confir-
mation, would, in my judgment, deny the inmate admittedly diminished due process
guaianteed him by the federal Constitution [citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556] and by
Article XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
Kane, Civ. No. 136229, slip op. at 7 (Super. Ct. Mass. Aug. 5, 1983). One court, however, rejected
the argument that the manufacturer's recommendation rendered the unconfirmed use of the EMIT
test unreasonable. Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. at 1514. Several commentators suggest that the confir-
matory testing should be other. than EMIT and other than RIA, an immunoassay test discussed
supra note 8. See, e.g., Divoll & Greenblatt, supra note 227, at 116; McBay, supra note 3, at 38;
Morgan, supra note 6, at 312; Zeese, supra note 3, at 26-27. In addition, in an advisory published
by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control
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some courts permit departures from this standard of care recognized by the industry
itself. 246
The use of scientific unspecialized staff and potential problems with the on-site
conditions further compound problems with the accuracy of the device. 247 Proponents
of the test suggest that EMIT procedures can be performed simply and are essentially
"idiot proof,"20 but failure to follow precisely the manufacturer's instructions increases
the likelihood of inaccurate results, and unspecialized individuals may not appreciate
fully the significance of constant quality monitoring."' In reports surveying the perfor-
mance of the competence of drug-screening clinical laboratories that are not on-site and
which employ persons with training and experience in analytical chemistry, researchers
have found the false-positive rates to range from twenty to seventy percent. 25° Thus,
personnel that do not have extensive scientific training present an even greater potential
for error.
Courts have exhibited widely varying degrees of tolerance for the imprecision in-
herent in EMIT testing. The crux of the due process analysis has centered on the
unconfirmed nature of the test results. 25 ' Three state courts and one federal district
court have held that an additional test must confirm an EMIT test to be admissible in a
prison disciplinary proceeding because of the serious questions experts raise concerning
the technology's validity. 252 Three of these courts have held that confirmation testing
must be by an alternative method of analysis. 253 In addition, the Federal Bureau of
stressed that "[t]he manufacturer states that any positive test result should be confirmed by an
alternative method .... Therefore, a positive result by the urine cannabinoid test indicates only
the likelihood of prior use." MMWR, supra note 243, at 469. For problems with alternative tech-
nology available, see McBay, supra note 3, at 33, 40; Zeese, supra note 3, at 27.
216 See, e.g., Jensen, 589 F. Supp. at 39.
247 See Morgan, supra note 6, at 309 ("Operator error, present to some degree in all technologies,
requires emphasis in a proposed on-site system using nonspecialist personnel.").
248 Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. at 1505.
2'9 See, e.g., id. at 1505 n.5 (defendant-prison's expert testified that failure to adhere to manu-
facturer's instructions could result in false-positives); see also Divoll & Greenblatt, supra note 227, at
115 (staff must properly position and calibrate the instrument prior to each assay, follow precise
instructions in the event of instrument shutdowns and to prevent sample contamination, and run
"blank samples" simultaneously with each run); McBay, supra note 3, at 38 (testing quality should
be monitored continuously); Morgan, supra note 6, at 313 (cites Einsel Commission Report, which
asserts that "poor management, inadequate personnel, broken chain of custody, and faulty main-
tenance and transmission of reports and records" cause most errors); id. at 314 (field studies of
accuracy fail to look at most important variable, "the briefly trained workers who are to he the on-
site operators").
250 See Morgan, supra note 6, at 314.
25 ' Unconfirmed tests are positive test results that an additional test with the same equipment
or an alternative testing method have not verified. Id. at 309.
252 See Wykoff, 613 F. Supp. at 1512; Denike, No. 83-2737, slip op. at 2 (D.N.J. April 6, 1984);
Kane, Civ. No. 136229, slip op. at 9 (Super. Ct. Mass. Aug. 5, 1983); Johnson v. Walton, No. S61-84
(Vt. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 1985) (cited in Wykoff, 613 F. Supp. at 151(}). See also lsaacks v. State, 646
S.W.2d 602, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). The court in Isaacks would not admit EMIT in a revocation
of probation proceeding because the state did not meet its burden of proof that the scientific
evidence was competent. Id. at 603. The court noted that the staff operator of the machine, who
testified to its accuracy, had no scientific background and no legislation or appellate cases had dealt
with EMIT's admissibility. Id. The court stated:
For the results of an EMET [sic] system test to be admissible, it must be shown that
the machine has attained scientific acceptance, that properly compounded chemicals
were used, that the machine has been periodically checked for accuracy by one who
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Prisons requires that federal prisons validate each positive urine test to substantiate a
positive result in its random urinalysis testing of inmates. 254 On the other hand, one
federal district court has upheld the admissibility of an unconfirmed EMIT test in a
prison disciplinary hearing,255 and two Georgia courts have accepted the unconfirmed
EMIT test as reliable and admissible in a probation revocation hearing, 256
 without ad-
dressing the constitutional implications.257
 Two federal district courts have denied pre-
liminary injunctions against the use of test results confirmed by an additional EMIT test
but have held that the evidence raised issues of concern strong enough to survive a
motion to dismiss. 258
understands its scientific theory, and proof must be offered by one qualified to translate
and to interpret the result so as to eliminate hearsay.
Id.
259
	 No. 83-2737, slip op. at 2 (D.N.J. April 6, 1984); Kane, Civ. No. 136229, slip op. at
9 (Super. Ct. Mass. Aug. 5, 1983); Johnson, No. 861.84 (Vt. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 1985) (cited in
Wykoff, 613 F. Supp. at 1510).
254
	
C.F.R. § 550.42(c) (1986). The regulations appear to permit a disciplinary report on the
basis of an unsubstantiated urine test. 28 C.F.R. § 550.30(b) (1986).
255 Jensen, 589 F. Supp. at 39. The court noted that the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta
had found the procedure 97 to 99 percent accurate and concluded that the test's "almost complete
certainty" constituted an adequate level of reliability for purposes of imposing administrative
punishment in the prison context. Id. The court commented that prisoners could claim the test as
false through their representative by requiring a confirmatory test or by stressing the state's sole
reliance on the test at the disciplinary hearing. Id. The court thus implied that preservation of
evidence and a hearing that provided the inmate with a meaningful opportunity to contest the test
would make up for any deficiencies in the test's accuracy.
I" Smith v. State, 250 Ga. 438, 440, 298 S.E.2d 482, 484 (1983); Hunt v. State, 173 Ga. App.
638, 640, 327 S.E.2d 500, 501 (1985).
252 The Georgia Supreme Court in Smith merely held that it was within the judge's discretion
whether or not to admit scientific evidence and that the trial court's ruling was supported by the
evidence. Smith, 250 Ga. at 440, 298 S.E.2d at 484. In Hunt, the State revoked the appellant's
probation when his EMIT test showed positive. Hunt, 173 Ga. App. at 638-39, 327 S.E.2d at 500.
At the probation revocation hearing, held six weeks after the positive EMIT test, the probationer
filed a handwritten motion for a continuance in order to evaluate independently the test results.
Id. at 639, 327 S.E.2d at 500. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's denial of
the motion and revocation of the appellant's probation because the defendant's failure to file a
timely motion showed lack of due diligence to support denial of the continuance. Id. at 639-40,
327 S.E.2d at 501.
258 See, e.g., Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. at 1515 (allegations of EMIT's unreliability "give rise to a
cognizable constitutional claim and, at a minimum, raise issues of real concern"); Storms, 600 F.
Supp. at 1222 ("this record and these authorities raise an issue of substance as to the test's reli-
ability"). The Peranzo court denied preliminary injunctive relief but nevertheless expressed hope
that the degree of reliability "as conducted by defendants" would be made available to the court before
trial. Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. at 1515 (emphasis in original). Most significantly, the court added,
We would hope as well that the defendants would give serious consideration to
whether, as a matter of policy and prudence, confirmatory testing should be performed
at least in those circumstances where there is reason to believe that a misbehavior
report will impact severely on an inmate.
Id. In Storms, the court refused to issue a preliminary injunction on the use of a single EMIT test
because the prison had disciplined none of the prisoners on the basis of the positive results. Storms,
600 F. Supp. at 1225. The prisoners had asserted that the possibility that the prison would discipline
them solely on the basis of an unconfirmed EMIT test violated their constitutional rights to due
process. Id. at 1216. Yet although the evidence concerning lack of reliability was not strong enough
to justify issuance of a preliminary injunction, it did raise "an issue of substance" strong enough to
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In addition, courts have expressed concern with the reliability of the prison's own
testing methods apart from any inaccuracies inherent in the technology itself. 26° For
example, the potential for on-site error led the court in Peranzo v. Coughlin to hold that
although the prisoner's showing of unreliable testing was insufficient to grant preliminary
injunctive relief from such testing, it did "raise issues of real concern." 26° Consequently,
the court held that the matter should proceed to trial on the merits but stressed, in
addition, that before trial it wished to have more information on the degree of reliability
of EMIT testing as conducted by the prison. 26 ' Indeed the New Jersey Department of
Corrections agreed to submit to a dismissal ordering confirmation testing when, in
preparation for its defense, it sent four hundred of its own positive test results to a
trained laboratory technician and twenty-five percent of the positives remained uncon-
firmed after two successive confirmatory testings at two laboratories. 262 Other courts
similarly have found troublesome the prison's failure adequately to secure samples from
possible tampering263 and to save samples for independent testing at the prisoner's
request. 264 The federal district court in Storms v. Coughlin reasoned that retesting on the
survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 1222. The court commented:
[T]he issue [of EMIT reliability] poses a substantial question. It must be remembered
that these tests are random; they are done with no reason to think that the particular
inmate is using drugs. The EMIT results are thus ordinarily the sole ground for
discipline. The question would not be so close if the prisoners were tested only after
exhibiting behavior or an appearance consistent with drug use or after having been
found to possess drugs.
Id. at 1225.
259
	
e.g., Higgs, 616 F. Supp. at 231 (court finds noteworthy evidence that prisoners potentially
had access to and could tamper with other prisoners' samples); Peranzo, 608 F. Supp at 1515 (court
denied defendant-prison's motion to dismiss and expressed hope that defendant would increase
the court's knowledge of "the degree of reliability of EMIT testing as conducted by the defendants"
before trial) (emphasis in original); Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1225 (court found troublesome prison's
practice of disposing of urine samples and thus precluding prisoners' ability to obtain an indepen-
dent test). See also Morgan, supra note 6, at 316 & n.2 (court in Denike ordered state to cease
unconfirmed tests where field study of prison's program showed twenty-five percent false-positive
rate) (citing data given to the author by the state corrections department and not presented or
argued by the state in Denike, No. 83-2737 (D.N.J. Apr. 6, 1984)).
260 608 F. Supp. 1504, 1515 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
261 Id.
262 Morgan, supra note 6, at 316. Of the 400 positives sent to Roche Clinical Laboratories in
Raritan, New Jersey, 107 were unconfirmed by RIA (discussed supra note 8). Id. These 107 uncon-
firmed samples were then forwarded for retesting by GC/MS (discussed supra note 3) at Roche
Analytic Laboratories in Richmond, Virginia, and they still remained unconfirmed. Id. The correc-
tions department did not present the data at the court hearing and agreed to confirmation testing
without argument. Id.
265 Storms, 600 F. Supp. 1214.
264 Id. at 1225. The Storms court stated,
While [double EMIT testing] will correct for human error in the testing process, it
will not affect machine-generated error. Only testing by a different method can do
that. This course is made impossible by the prison's practice of disposing of the urine
sample after testing, thus denying the prisoners who wish to obtain an independent
test the opportunity to do so. This practice too is troublesome.
Id.
The Supreme Court in California v. Trombetta held that the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution does not require that law enforcement agencies
preserve breath samples of those charged with driving while intoxicated. 467 U.S. 479, 491 (1984),
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same equipment could not correct for machine-generated error and thus one of the
prisoner's only opportunities to correct for faulty testing would be to secure independent
testing. 265 Hence, courts have stressed that the prison's own accuracy is important in
addition to EMIT's proferred accuracy rate and that other procedural safeguards, such
as preservation of the urine samples and strict attention to custody of the samples, are
important to upholding a prison's urine-testing program.
Thus, most courts have focused on the reliability of a given prison program as it
reflects on the prisoner's due process rights. One court, however, has suggested that an
examination of the reasonableness of a scientific testing procedure, for purposes of the
fourth amendment, is in part based on its reliability as a means of determining miscon-
duct. 266 Concerns with the reliability of the most commonly used urinalysis device, the
EMIT, are raised by the technology itself267 and by its use as an on-site device, to be
operated by the prison's own staff. 268 Most courts have not readily admitted EMIT
evidence as a scientifically acceptable technique. These courts have allowed its use where
the test's positive readout is confirmed by another EMIT test or an alternative method
of testing. 269 In addition, courts have focused in part on the prison's own implementation
of the on-site technology in assessing prisoners' claims of denial of due process. 2"
In sum, courts that have assessed the reasonableness of prison-urinalysis programs
have held that the traditional probable cause and warrant standards of the fourth
amendment are not required in the prison setting. 271 Furthermore, courts have upheld
wholly random urinalysis searches of prisoners not based on any individualized suspicion
on remand, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1093,219 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1985). The Court reasoned that preservation
of breath samples ordinarily would be of little exculpatory value where the state conducted two
independent tests of the samples, with an intervening blank run designed to purge the machine of
previous alcohol traces. Id. at 489. Other procedural safeguards included cross-examination of the
law enforcement officer who had administered the test and the opportunity to inspect the machine
and its weekly results. Id. at 490. The federal district court in Peranzo stated that the Court's analysis
in Trombetta "reflects a general recognition that states need not implement all possible procedural
safeguards against erroneous deprivations of liberty when utilizing the results of scientific testing
devices in accusatory proceedings." Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. at 1509.
The Trombetta case, however, involved a situation in which a law enforcement officer had reason
to suspect the individual had been driving while intoxicated. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 482. As the
Storms court pointed out, urine tests are random and conducted with no reason to believe the
prisoner is using drugs. Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1225. The Storms court found the fact that EMIT
results ordinarily are the sole ground for discipline, coupled with the prison's practice of disposing
of samples, troubling. Id. Furthermore, Trombetta's total exposure to the testing process would
depend upon his propensity for suspicious driving, but it most likely would not begin to approximate
the number of times a prisoner would be subject to a health and welfare urine inspection. See, e.g.,
td. at 1216 (random tests performed daily). In addition, although the Court in Trombetta noted that
the test had passed various accuracy requirements, it nevertheless commented that "if the Intoxilyzer
were truly prone to erroneous readings, then Intoxilyzer results without more might be insufficient
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489 nn. 9-10 (citing Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)).
265
 600 F. Supp. at 1225.
266 See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
267 See supra notes 235-46 and accompanying text.
265 See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
269 See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text. But cf. supra notes 255-57.
279 See supra notes 259-65 and accompanying text.
471
 See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
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of drug use. 272 Courts have found support for random searches in the Supreme Court's
holding in Bell v. Wolfish273 — that prison officials can search prisoners routinely after
contact visits with outsiders, provided the searches are conducted in a reasonable man-
ner.274
Beyond this underlying conclusion, courts have outlined the basic contours of rea-
sonableness based on the Supreme Court's analysis of blood-extraction searches in
Schmerber v. California. 275 In addition, concerns that the Court has expressed in evaluating
the reasonableness of administrative searches based on less than probable cause are
evident in the courts' reasonableness assessment. 275 Accordingly, courts have focused
primarily on the prison's manner of testing the prisoners. This inquiry has turned on
such factors as how privately the prison conducts the searches, whether the prison
provides the prisoners with advance notice of the testing program or the individual test,
and whether the discretionary power of the searchers is adequately circumscribed. In
addition, courts have looked carefully at whether legitimate security needs necessitate
the random program and, in the same vein, whether the testing is truly random, and
thus nonpersonal in nature. Finally, one court has analyzed the reasonableness of a
prison urinalysis program based in part on an assessment of the reliability of the test as
evaluated by courts that have addressed prisoner due process challenges to the testing.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR IMPLEMENTING URINALYSIS SEARCH PROGRAMS
If there is to be "no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons," 277
then courts which evaluate prison urinalysis programs should affirmatively recognize
that a prisoner has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his or her person. 218 Further-
more, if courts continue to accept the current proposition that prisons can conduct
warrantless searches based on virtually no individualized cause other than a generalized
prison security problem, then courts should clarify what constitutional safeguards ulti-
mately will protect prisoners' fourth amendment rights. Without recognized principles
to guide the courts' reasonableness inquiry, as in the criminal search area, prisoners are
left, in effect, with a balancing approach to assessing reasonableness. Because, as com-
mentators note, all fourth amendment protections can be balanced away272 — outweighed
272 hi.
275 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
279
	 supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
275 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See supra notes 177-90 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 192-211 and accompanying text.
277 Wolff 418 U.S. at 555-56.
275 The Supreme Court, however, has not affirmatively recognized a prisoner's right to privacy
in his or her person. In Hudson the Court held that the fourth amendment does not apply to cells;
the Court left open the question of whether prisoners' persons are covered by the amendment. 468
U.S. at 525-26. Earlier, in Bell, the Court addressed the constitutionality of body cavity searches
but assumed the applicability of the fourth amendment to body searches "for present purposes."
441 U.S. at 558. For a discussion of Hudson and Bell, see supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
279 See, e.g., Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note 60, at 1073. Professors Gianelli and Gilligan
comment that while balancing is "descriptive of the process that courts must perform in making
the reasonableness evaluation, the balancing concept does not provide a standard for that evaluation.
Since ... all fourth amendment protections could be 'balanced away,' certain principles must be
recognized in order to safeguard prisoners' rights." Id. See also Kitch, The Supreme Court's Code of
Criminal Procedure: 1968-1969 Edition, 1969 SUP. Cr. REV. 155, 168. Professor Kitch notes, "[tihe
balancing approach to the legality of Fourth Amendment searches has a certain ominous ring. It
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in the balance with institutional objectives to which the Court gives great deference —
the balancing approach may recognize that prisoners have fourth amendment rights but
it may not enhance significantly prisoners' protections.
Accordingly, in evaluating urinalysis programs, courts should seek to develop con-
stitutionally adequate substitutes for the traditional fourth amendment protections to
ensure prison institutional security needs at the least possible "cost" to constitutional
fourth amendment values. Safeguards are necessary because of the societal interest in
keeping the discipline and control of prisoners through body searches within the fourth
amendment's coverage. In addition, safeguards are necessary because these searches
implicate quasi-criminal concerns and are particularly susceptible to abuse in the prison
setting. Towards this end, courts should require one of the major protections envisioned
by the Camara Court in assessing the reasonableness of administrative housing searches:
prisons should conduct urinalysis searches pursuant to and in conformity with established
written institutional standards288
 — that is, regulations. In addition, courts should eval-
uate individual searches and individual programs with an eye towards procedural safe-
guards. Protections are necessitated by the special circumstances created by the prison
environment, which is open to abuse by prison officials who may have participated in
misconduct or have personal interests in harassing or disciplining certain prisoners and
who have access to the on-site technology employed.
A. Recognition of Prisoners' Expectation of Privacy: The Societal Interest
Society should be prepared to recognize that prisoners have reasonable and legiti-
mate expectations that they will not be subject to unreasonable and arbitrary searches
of their person because the public interest lies in the rehabilitation of prisoners. 28 ' As
the Supreme Court has noted with respect to parolees, fair treatment of prisoners will
encourage rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness. 282
 Thus, while the arbi-
trary exercise of power may serve short-term security interests, over the long run it may
serve to compromise the ability of the prison system to further rehabilitative goals. 288
is always the reasonable demands of the public interest that are used to justify incursions on civil
liberties." As another commentator has noted, "Mt the mere mention of security from the lips of
a correctional administrator, a majority of the Court begins to man the barricades." Cohen, Search
and Seizure of Prison Cells — The Constitution Takes a Holiday, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. 171, 175 (1985).
28°
 Camara, 387 U.S. at 538 (to conduct an area inspection there must be reasonable legislative
or administrative standards which are satisfied with respect to a particular building). For a good
discussion of why regulations enhance the reasonableness of searches generally, see Amsterdam,
supra note 19, at 416-29. For discussions of the benefits of "rulemaking" in the prison context, see
Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note 60, at 1075-76; Note, Body Searches, supra note 67, at 1055. See also
Matz v. Satran, 313 N,W.2d 740, 742 (N.D. 1981). The Matz court noted, "kin the prison context,
the requirement of reasonably precise rules is not an empty formality; notice of behavioral standards
enhances the inmate's sense of fair play and reduces the risk of arbitrary administration. Moreover,
equal treatment of similar conduct is more certain within fixed rules."
281 Gianelli & Gilligan, supra note 60, at 1069 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412
(1974)). The Court in Procunier stated that an important objective of a penal system is the "reha-
bilitation of prisoners." Procunier, 416 U.S. at 412. See also Singer, supra note 60, at 699 ("the purpose
of the prison should be protection, security and rehabilitation; whatever its present practice it
should not be an instrument of degradation and a perpetrator of dehumanization").
28' Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).
288
 Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note 60. at 1069 ("Without the privacy and dignity provided by
the fourth amendment coverage, an inmate's opportunity to reform, as small as it may be, will
further be diminished"); Singer, supra note 60, at 699-700 ("by restoring the dignity of the inmate,
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In addition, society has an interest in avoiding radical shifts in a prisoner's own
beliefs in . himself or herself and those important to the prisoner that will have an obvious
impact on the prisoner's relationship to the community once the prisoner is released .284
As former Chief Justice Burger has noted, when society incarcerates individuals, it
becomes obligated "to help the offender to help himself begin again." 285 Yet excessive
surveillance, of varying levels of intrusiveness, degrades and ultimately dehumanizes
prisoners.286 Rehabilitative goals are not served by repeatedly impressing upon a prisoner
that he or she has no humanity. 287 Indeed, a prisoner who undergoes continued self-
abasement may become increasingly violent. 288 To divorce the "routine-procedure" in-
trusiveness of the urinalysis search from its contribution to the total "message" which
prisoners receive is to underestimate its ultimately dehumanizing and degrading im-
pact. 289
Finally, society should recognize that prisoners have legitimate and reasonable pri-
vacy interests in their persons because society has a basic interest in assuring that the
government does not violate fundamental rights on an ongoing basis. 29° A conclusion
that prisoners do not retain legitimate rights of privacy in their persons precludes any
fourth amendment inquiry into the reasonableness of searches of the person. 281 Coupled
we are likely to decrease the potential security problem, while a decision in favor of security can
only decrease the humanity of the resident"); Note, Body Searches, supra note 67, at 1050 ("excessive
surveillance may indirectly create greater security risks than it cures").
284 Singer, supra note 60, at 669 (quoting E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS, 14, 18-19 (1961) (a prisoner
experiences "radical shifts in his moral career" as a result of "a series of abasements, degradations,
humiliations, and profanations of self ")). See also Edwards, Foreword to Symposium on Prisoners' Rights
— Penitentiaries Produce No Penitents, 63 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY AND POLICE SCIENCE 154, 157
(1972) ("The victim of the vengeance omnipresent in both sentencing and prison treatment fre-
quently returns to society inclined to seek vengeance himself." (citing K. MENNINCER, THE CRIME
OF PUNISHMENT 214-18 (1968)).
282 Cohen, supra note 279, at 174 n.8 (citing Burger, Foreword to COMPENDIUM OF MODEL
CORRECTIONAL LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS (2d ed. 1972)).
286 See also Singer, supra note 60, at 694 (acts of intrusion are wrongful not because they cause
distress and embarrassment; "[t]hey are wrongful because they are demeaning of individuality and
they are such whether or not they cause emotional trauma") (quoting Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect
of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U: L. REV. 962, 973-74 (1964)).
2"/d. at 715.
288 See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 552 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens writes: "Depriving inmates of any residuum of privacy or possessory rights is in fact plainly
contrary to institutional goals. Sociologists recognize that prisoners deprived of any sense of individ-
uality devalue themselves and others and therefore are more prone to violence toward themselves
or others." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original) (citing
Schwartz, Deprivation of Privacy as a"Functional Prerequisite": The Case of the Prison, 63 J. CRIM. L. C.
& P.S. 229 (1972)). Justice Stevens goes on to cite Professors Gianelli and Gilligan: "'It is anomalous
to provide a prisoner with rehabilitative programs and services in an effort to build self-respect
while simultaneously subjecting him to unjustified and degrading searches and seizures. – Id. (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note 60, at
1069). See also Note, Body Searches, supra note 67, at 1050 ("Social scientists have found that a
reduced sense of self-identity can be associated with an increase in violent and irrational behavior.").
22g See Singer, supra note 60, at 715 ("Perhaps the small harassments and hassles, such as hourly
bed checks, with flashlights in the face, ... can be every bit as demeaning, and dehumanizing, as
the larger ones.").
290 Higgs, 616 F. Supp. at 232.
29 ' As Professor Amsterdam notes:
The question of what constitutes a covered "search" or "seizure" would and should be
viewed with an appreciation that to exclude any particular police activity from coverage
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with the Supreme Court's holding that prison searches of cells and belongings are not
covered by the fourth amendment, 292 such a conclusion essentially would isolate from
judicial and constitutional scrutiny an extremely wide range of prison search practices 295
and would appear inconsistent with the Court's rejection of the hands-off approach to
prison administration. 294 Former Chief Justice Burger has noted that concern with the
treatment of prisoners arises in part from a fundamental belief that the way a society
treats those persons who transgress it is indicative of the essential character of that
society.295 Accordingly, society should be reluctant to sanction the absolute retraction of
fundamental fourth amendment rights in the prison setting as a solution to short-term
security interests. Such acceptance may lend support to the belief that constitutional
protections are too dangerous to enforce296 in other settings where the governmental
interest is strong and individuals retain only limited fourth amendment protection. 297
B. Prison Searches: Quasi
-Criminal and Potentially Open to Abuse
In addition to the strong societal interest in keeping the control and discipline of
prisoners through body searches within the ambit of the fourth amendment, courts
is essentially to exclude it from judicial control and from the command of reasonable-
ness, whereas to include it is to do no more than to say that is must be conducted in
a reasonable manner.
Amsterdam, supra note 19, at 393. As Justice Stevens noted in Hudson, a prison cell concededly may
have a trivial residuum of privacy associated with it. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 542 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens stated, however, that that trivial residuum "may
mark the difference between slavery and humanity." Id.
292 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 525-26.
298
	 Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note 60, at 1068. Professors Gianelli and Gilligan noted,
"[title Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to 'isolate from constitutional scrutiny' actions
of government agents that impinge upon fourth amendment interests." (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at
17).
294 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the hands-off approach to
prison administration. See also Camara, 387 U.S. at 532: "discretion of the official in the field ... is
precisely the discretion to invade private property which we have consistently circumscribed."
295 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 523-24.
296 See Rudovsky, The Criminal Justice System and the Role of the Police, in THE POLITICS OF LAW:
A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, 242, 247 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). Professor Rudovsky argues along similar
lines that the attack on the exclusionary rule, which excludes evidence gathered in violation of an
individual's fourth amendment rights,
is an example of the way the public's perception of the criminal process has been
consciously manipulated. The distortion of the actual impact of this rule on conviction
rates ... diverts the focus from the illegal police conduct and leads the public to
believe that constitutional principles are too dangerous to enforce.
.Id.
297 For example, other individuals whose fourth amendment protections are limited include
school children, military personnel, and government employees. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 340 (1985) (school children); Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) - (military personnel); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 489 (N.D. Ga. 1985)
(government employees). See also Rudovsky, supra note 296, at 245. Professor Rudovsky argues that
Ipiersonal fear and pressure to protect by any means society's short-run interest in order inevitably
leads to state-sanctioned brutality and violation of individual rights." Professor Kitch similarly argues
that "kit is always the reasonable demands of the public interest that are used to justify incursions
on civil liberties." Kitch, supra note 279, at 168. For a partial listing of drug-testing decisions
requiring varying degrees of constitutional protection in non-prison settings — for example, schools,
police departments, bus companies — see Banzhaf, How to Make Drug Tests Pass Muster, NAT'L L.J.,
Jan, 12, 1987, at 13, 24.
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should recognize that substitutes for warrants are particularly apt given the quasi-
criminal nature of prison urinalysis testing. Urinalysis programs are designed to uncover
evidence admissible in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding; 298 indeed, a program's
effectiveness in deterring drug use depends upon the prison administration's threat that
prisoners whose urine samples test positive may be punished. 299 Moreover, a positive test
potentially will result in significant forms of punishment. 300 Furthermore, those who
conduct "inspections" are often those who search for evidence of criminal conduct."'
Thus the distinction between prison searches as law enforcement or as administrative is
blurred."2
The substantial nexus between such procedures and punitive sanctions 305 suggests
in addition that courts should be particularly sensitive to the possibility of ulterior motives
behind individual searches even if conducted under an established administrative search
program."4 Prison employees have at times participated in or permitted drug trafficking.
As one court notes, official corruption pervades the prison system, and yet prison officers
who have participated in or permitted violations are empowered to search prisoners." 5
Indeed, one prison system's justification for strip searching prisoners within a maximum
security unit rested on the prison's repeated problems with its own guards smuggling in
298 See, e.g., Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note 60, at 1082-83 ("items uncovered during an
inspection may be admissible in subsequent criminal or disciplinary proceedings .... prison in-
spections are designed to uncover ... contraband").
299 Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1224-25. The Storms court stated, "Nile threat which is intended to
make this testing program an effective deterrent is that prisoners who are found to have urine
samples indicating that they are using drugs may be punished."
3°° See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
30 ' The Supreme Court expressed concern for administrative inspectors acting as a front for
the police in Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226 (1960). The Court stated that the government's
use of an administrative warrant to gather evidence for a criminal investigation "must meet stern
resistance by the courts. The preliminary stages of a criminal prosecution must be pursued in strict
obedience to the safeguards and restrictions of the Constitution and laws of the United States." Id.
"2 Gianelli and Gilligan; supra note 60, at 1083.
309 Id .
304 Note, Body Searches, supra note 67, at 1052.
3°3 Sec. & Law Enforcement Emp., Dist. C. 82 v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 212 (2d Cir. 1984). As
the Court noted in Johnson v. United States, the "competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime"
can color the judgment of searchers. 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). The Second Circuit in Carey noted
that prisons often empower prison employees to arrest offenders when the prison employees have
permitted and participated in the crimes themselves. Carey, 737 F.2d at 212. The Carey court, in
upholding urine tests for prison guards, quoted from the PRISONERS' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK:
There is ... one determinant of the prison condition that is not usually considered in
these discussions. It is the corrupt acts of prison officials. Official corruption pervades
the prison system, and necessarily compromises the integrity of and safety within the
prison. It inequitably distributes privilege to those who can afford to pay for it.
[0]fficers have had sex with inmates; brought them contraband, including food, liquor,
narcotics, and money used in at least one case to pay for an inmate's execution; ... .
Prison employees have permitted and participated in crimes for which they are em-
powered to arrest the offenders.
Id. (quoting from Flannery, Prison Corruption: A Mockery of justice, 2 PRISONERS' RTS. SCIRCEBOOK,.
271, 273-74 (1980)). See also Arruda v. Fair, 710 F.2d 886, 888 (1st Cir.) (in at least eight instances,
guards found to have been involved in smuggling contraband, including drugs, to prisoners in a
maximum security prison with a lengthy history of prison drug problems), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 999
(1983).
1028	 BOSTON COI I EGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 27:989
contraband." The searcher's desire to intimidate, humiliate, or degrade the prisoner
may be the predominant motive for searching a particular prisoner. 307 As the Court has
noted, a civilized society should not tolerate the intentional harassment of even society's
most hardened offenders." Thus, courts should be sensitive that law enforcement
searches potentially can pass under the guise of preventative security searches."
C. Regulations: Objectives and Necessary Components
Given the basic societal and institutional goals in the prison setting, courts should
require that prison administrators set forth and comply with informed guidelines, in the
form of regulations, as to how they will carry out their preventative, nonpersonalized
urinalysis search programs. 3 I° Regulations provide four fundamental protections envi-
sioned by the Court in Camara in evaluating administrative searches. First, the drafting
process ensures that some semblance of a neutral decisionmaker is interposed between
prison officials and the guards, in particular, and the prisoners 31' In addition, regulations
provide notice to prisoners of what they can expect. 312 Thus, regulations would assure
prisoners that lawful authority exists to search and enable prisoners to verify the appro-
priate limits of the inspection. 313 As the Court in Camara noted, warrantless searches can
be unreasonable in part because they fail to verify either the need for or the appropriate
limits of the search 5 19 Just as authority to search in the form of a warrant would lessen
the intrusiveness of a dwelling search, so would authority to search in the form of
detailed regulations mitigate the intrusiveness of unpredictable and potentially arbitrary
urinalysis searches. 313 Furthermore, regulations that set forth neutral criteria for initi-
ating and conducting searches impose controls on the discretionary power of lower-
3°6 Arruda, 710 F.2d at 887-88. The Senior Judge, in dissent in Arruda, found the prison's
problem with its own "incorrigible" guards "seems no rationale at all here." Id. at 889 (Maletz,
Senior Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
307 See Singer, supra note 60, at 699-701 ("the entire process of prison is designed to destroy
the last remnants of the dignity of the individual"); id. at 700 ("the usual 'search' is neither for
purposes of discovering weapons, or for preventing bloodshed; it is a 'functional' search — it 'keeps
the inmates uncertain' and 'on their toes'"); id. at 703 (hair and clothing regulations in prison begun
with "only one purpose in mind — the degradation and humiliation of the inmate").
" Hudson, 468 U.S. at 528.
3°9
	
Gianelli and Gilligan, supra. note 60, at 1083. Professors Gianelli and Gilligan noted that
"[t]he danger is that inspectors will be used as a subterfuge for law enforcement searches." Id. See
also supra note 307.
31 ° Commentators calling for prison search regulations include Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note
60, at 1075-77; Note Body Searches, supra note 67, at 1055. Professor Singer cites a 1961 Maryland
case in which the court, in response to the prisoners' allegations of brutality, ordered adoption of
rules concerning cell and person searches. Singer, supra note 60, at 676 n.21.
Professor Amsterdam calls for rulemaking in search situations generally. See Amsterdam, supra
note 19, at 415-29. Professors Gianelli and Gilligan cite commentators arguing for police search
rulemaking. See Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note 60, at 1075 n.199.
311 See Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note 60, at 1076 (rule promulgation would lie with high level
officials, thereby removing policymaking from guards).
312 Note, Body Searches, supra note 67, at 1055.
313 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 540.
"4 Id.
"5 See Note, Body Searches, supra note 67, at 1055.
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echelon prison officials to search. 31 ° Finally, regulations provide an objective standard
against which to measure individual searches. 3 "
As a basic requirement, regulations should affirmatively set forth the noncriminal,
security objectives of the prison's urinalysis program. 318 In addition, regulations should
particularize the nature of the searches and the conditions and manner under which
they should be conducted. In their totality, regulations should provide an objective and
informed standard for review.
Because random searches are not based on any particularized suspicion that the
prisoner should be searched, courts should place the burden on the state to establish a
generalized antecedent justification for searching. 312 The courts should require more
than conclusory assertions that prisons are dangerous and drugs create opportunities
for violence. The burden should be on the state to justify a urinalysis program by
demonstrating the extent of the drug problem and the effectiveness of the urinalysis
program in dealing with the problem. 32°
In this vein, courts should bear in mind that the Court in Schmerber evaluated the
reasonableness of an intrusive bodily search based in part on the likelihood that the
search would produce the evidence of guilt sought."' In the prison context, as one
commentator suggests, the likelihood of finding evidence of drug possession is perhaps
greatest and consequently the governmental security interest is perhaps strongest at the
point where drugs are first introduced into the prison, through prisoners' contact with
outsiders. 322 Presumably, searches of prisoners who have already been searched after all
contacts with visitors are less likely to yield drugs than are the post-contact searches
themselves. 323 In addition, internal searches are even less likely to yield drugs given the
freedom with which prison administrators may search cells and belongings after Hudson
v. Palmer. 324 Furthermore, one might argue that the traffic in drugs creates more serious
risks of conflict than does the ingestion of some drugs, such as marijuana. 323 Thus, even
given the judicially noticed drug problems in American prison systems, 326 courts should
consider the actual effectiveness of internal drug detection searches. To date, courts
"6 See Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note 60, at 1084; Note, Body Searches, supra note 67, at 1055.
317 The Camara court required standards against which to measure searches. See supra note 141.
31 ' See, e.g., Denike, No. 83-2737, slip op. at 4 (D.N.J. April 6, 1984).
319 Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note 60, at 1074.
32° See Cohen, supra note 279, at 175. Professor Cohen termed the prisons' usual burden of
proof "feather-light" and "virtually unbeatable." Id. Professor Cohen asserted that "[al the mere
mention of security from the lips of a correctional administrator, a majority of the Court begins to
man the barricades." Id.
52 ' See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
322 See Note, Body Searches, supra note 67, at 1054 n.144 and accompanying text.
323 Id.
324 For a discussion of Hudson, see supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
325 Professors Gianelli and Gilligan note that the acquisition of drugs is power. Gianelli and
Gilligan, supra note 60, at 1071 n.171 (quoting National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals, Corrections 39 (1973)).
326 For United States Supreme Court's judicial notice of prison drug problems see Block v.
Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 588-89 (1984) ("we can take judicial notice that the unauthorized use
of narcotics is a problem that plagues virtually every penal and detention center in the country").
See also Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527 ("attempts to introduce drugs and other contraband into the
premises ... we can judicially notice, is one of the most perplexing problems of prisons today").
The New York Federal District Court in Storms took "judicial notice that drug use among prisoners
is a serious, disruptive problem within American prisons." Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1220.
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have briefly referred to the Supreme Court's comments on drug use and its attendant
problems in the prisons"' to conclude that cause exists to conduct searches based on no
individualized suspicion. One writer has termed the burden of proof on corrections
officials to justify prison searches as "reasonable speculation." 328
 Unfortunately, this scant
attempt to include in the case law the exact showing of the specific prison necessity and
the effectiveness of the programs employed does not aid in laying the groundwork for
a valid program or in evaluating the foundation necessary to justify an existing program.
In addition, this antecedent justification component of the required regulations
should be tailored to the institution involved and even to the particular security status
of those prisoners to be searched.329
 The prObable cause in Camara needed to justify
issuance of a warrant for inspection did not depend upon specific knowledge of the
condition of the building in question, but it did depend upon the condition of the area
to be searched, the nature of the building, and the passage of time.'" If, for example,
in a maximum security facility, the prison never has found contraband in such a search
or has shown no evidence of a drug problem, then frequent urine searches may indicate
that the prison has a hidden agenda, in addition to its professed security interests, which
may potentially include the punishment, intimidation, humiliation, and degradation of
prisoners.°" However effective these tactics may be in ensuring the prison's short-term
security needs,332
 they should be recognized as counter to the long-term rehabilitative
purposes of the prison system."'
In affirmatively setting forth the objectives of the search program, the regulations
should set forth neutral, nonindividualized criteria for initiating a search, such as guide-
427 See Block, 468 U.S. at 588-89.
525 Cohen, supra note 279, at 175. Professor Cohen continues, "[a] witness for corrections need
only provide testimony as to his or her employment — this creates instant expertise — and then
offer the opinion that X will create a security problem. The combination of a feather-light burden
of proof and conferred expertise gives the corrections officials a virtually unbeatable position . ..."
Id.
322 See Singer, supra note 60, at 682 n.42. Professor Singer comments, "we must cease talking
about 'the' prison and 'the' prisoners, and begin a more careful analysis. For prisons and other
correctional institutions are divided into several classes of 'security,' .... we should at least consider
whether different regulations indeed, different constitutional standards, might not apply ... in
these allegedly different grades of institutions." Id. See also Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note 60, at
1084, 1086 (security requirements may differ from a maximum to minimum security facility). For
example, in Frazier v. Ward, a New York Federal District Court held that strip searches, complete
with rectal and testicle examinations, violated the fourth amendment where the prison had never
found contraband. 426 F. Supp. 1354, 1366 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). The prison conducted the searches
at issue when it transferred the prisoner out of a special disciplinary unit. Id. at 1362. The court
found that "the removals were from sterile cells, with the inmate in handcuffs and belt, and kept
under continuous observation of correction officers." Id. at 1365. See also Hurley v. Ward, 584 F.2d
609, 611 (2d Cir. 1978) (anal and genital searches of inmate unnecessary and unjustified where
prisoner was heavily shackled and under close and constant guard during his few restricted excur-
sions from his segregated cell).
335 Camara, 387 U.S. at 538.
94l
	 and Gilligan, supra note 60, at 1083. See also supra note 307 and accompanying text
for a discussion of improper search purposes.
332
 For a discussion of how these tactics undermine prison security, see supra notes 106-12 and
accompanying text.
353 See supra notes 106 and 112. Courts also should question whether such programs violate the
eighth amendment to the Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII. For a discussion of the use of the eighth amendment in prison search cases,
see Note, Body Searches, supra note 67, at 1039-40.
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lines as to how frequently the searches will be conducted, who can authorize a search,
and who can execute the search. The mere existence of the rules should encourage
uniform treatment334 and assure the regularity of the routine. 335 Controls on the discre-
tionary power to search are particularly important in an environment where those who
serve as inspectors for administrative purposes may also serve as searchers for evidence
of criminal conduct. 336
In addition, specified search guidelines would circumscribe the searching officer's
discretion in executing the search. Regulations should specify where prison officials must
conduct searches with an eye towards maximum privacy and safety."' Nonconsensual
intrusions into the human body outside of a hygienic, medical environment are partic-
ularly offensive to the values embodied within the fourth amendment. 338 That urine
samples are taken by nonmedically trained personnel outside of a hospital environment
is a factor which weighs against the reasonableness of these procedures. 339 Conducting
searches in the view of unnecessary watchers, such as other prisoners or superfluous
staff members, 34° subjects prisoners to unnecessary embarrassment and potentially invites
the sexual harassment that is endemic in the penal environment."' In addition, prisons
should conduct searches during normal waking hours. 342 Because individuals are incar-
cerated for twenty-four hours a day, a prison should be hard pressed to justify a urinalysis
search conducted during sleeping hours.
Furthermore, by requiring that the prisons establish rules that protect fourth amend-
ment interests in privacy and bodily integrity and safety, courts can use the rules as an
objective standard against which to measure the constitutionality of specific searches of
individuals and avoid judicial mandates of how prisons should be operated. The Court
in Camara requires a magistrate to look to whether the inspection for which authorization
is sought is consistent with the established "reasonable legislative or administrative stan-
dards."343 Once a prison has an established policy that satisfies basic fourth amendment
requirements, the court's role is to evaluate whether prison officials have complied with
their own rules in an individual case. Such a case-by-case approach would be consistent
with the Court's rejection of the hands-off approach to evaluating prison practices, 344
yet it would enable courts to continue to defer to prisons' administrative judgments as
to how prisons are to be operated. 945
534 Gianelli and Gilligan, supra note 60, at 1076. See also Matz, 313 N.W.2d at 742 (equal
treatment is more certain within fixed rules).
355 Amsterdam, supra note 19, at 418.
996 See supra note 159.
"7 Id.
"6 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771-72.
"9 See id.
s40 See, e.g., Storms, 600 F. Supp. at 1222 (if no legitimate security need to do so, searches in
front of onlookers are unreasonable).
341 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 577 (evidence existed in the record that body cavity searches conducted
in front of other prisoners "engendered among detainees fears of sexual assault" and "were the
occasion for actual threats of physical abuse by guards") (Marshall, J., dissenting).
342 See, e.g., Tucker, 613 F. Supp. at 1130-31 (prison's motion to dismiss denied where prison
gave no reason why, among other defects, it had to conduct a search at five a.m. when it can assume
prisoners are sleeping).
649
 Camara, 387 U.S. at 538.
544 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
445 In Bell, the Court noted that prison administrators "should be accorded wide-ranging de-
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In addition to requiring detailed regulations, courts seriously should question the
controversial reliability of the most widely used testing device, the EMIT, and recognize
the heightened potential for abuse in the prison setting. Given the defects inherent in
the technology and the on-site testing, courts should require that prisons affirmatively
establish the reliability of the tests and the reliability of their own programs. In addition,
courts should, at a minimum, require that prisons confirm EMIT test results, preferably
by an alternative method of drug screening. Given the tests' questionable reliability and
the special potential for abuse in the prison environment, courts should place great
emphasis on the justification to search. Optimally, courts should require more than
confirmation testing and should look for additional corroboration of drug use by some
evidence other than testing.
CONCLUSION
Courts currently are in agreement that prisons can conduct urinalysis testing of
prisoners without violating the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure. As a starting point, courts have recognized that the Supreme Court
has accorded wide-ranging deference to prison administrators to manage in their best
judgment. In addition, courts have recognized that individuals have reduced expectations
of privacy upon incarceration. Yet despite these substantial bulwarks against striking a
prison practice as an unreasonable search, courts for the most part have examined prison
urinalysis programs with an eye towards maintaining for prisoners a degree of privacy
and humanity that comports with the fundamental purposes of the fourth amendment.
Concluding that urinalysis testing of prisoners is a search and consequently evalu-
ating the reasonableness of those searches under the fourth amendment are important
steps towards assuring that constitutional protections of prisoners are not unrealized
promises. Courts should not delegate unreviewable power to prisons by denying to
prisoners fourth amendment protections from unreasonable body searches or by defer-
ring summarily to the prisons' claims of "security needs." Courts should proscribe stan-
dardless searches in the prison setting as unreasonable by requiring prisons to supply
concrete justification for implementing urinalysis programs. Rehabilitative goals will best
be served in the long run if prisons and courts work towards viable guidelines for
searches that recognize and enhance the prisoner's basic human interests in privacy and
dignity.
ANNE E. CFtAIGE
Terence in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed
to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Bell, 441 U.S. at
547.
